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ABSTRACT 
From Duty to Care to Duty to Be Well: 
A Discourse Analysis of Ontario's Capacity to Consent Law 
Sheila L. Oakley 
Principles of neo-liberalism, our current doctrine of political rationality, call for reduced 
state involvement and a greater reliance on autonomous, self-governing individuals who 
avoid risks and take initiatives to improve their well-being. However contradictions arise 
within these principles. In making autonomous choices, one must also adhere to the 
values of health and security; individual choice is thereby constrained. 
Legal convention upholds the individual right to self-determination with respect to 
medical treatment. Patients must therefore give their informed consent before medical 
treatments or procedures are performed. The exception to this rule lies where a person 
lacks capacity to consent, such as in the case of certain psychiatric patients. 
In this thesis I examine Ontario's capacity to consent law specifically as it applies to the 
capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment. Through a discourse analysis of written 
legal decisions I argue that successive changes in consent and capacity law, most notably 
the inclusion of community treatment orders, compel psychiatric patients to align 
themselves with neo-liberal principles, namely the "duty to be well." 
Taking a governmentality approach, I argue that dominant discourses on risk, fear, 
freedom, autonomy and security inform the legal governance of psychiatric subjects, 
in 
compelling these subjects to engage in techniques of "responsibilization" in an effort to 
reduce various "risks of harm." 
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Introduction 
The right to be free from unwanted medical treatment and invasive 
procedures should not be disregarded lightly.... The consequences of a 
finding of incapacity are serious. The person found to be incapable loses 
autonomy over his decision making and, to a large extent, over his person. 
He may be forcibly treated against his wishes. Our courts have recognized 
that this constitutes sufficient interference with an individual's personal 
freedom interests to bring into operation the rights to "life, liberty and 
security of the person" as guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. 
The above statement from Justice Malloy of Ontario's Superior Court sets out the 
significance of being found incapable of consenting to medical treatment: the status of 
incapable means the subject is no longer free to refuse unwanted medical treatment. For 
patients involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital, this means medication may be 
administered against their will, by physical force if necessary. Patients found incapable 
of consenting to treatment who no longer meet the criteria for involuntary admission to a 
facility may still however be subject to a community treatment order (CTO) under the 
provisions of Ontario's Health Care Consent Act2 and Mental Health Act? In this case, 
treatment is not administered by physical force, however the subject of the CTO faces the 
continual threat of apprehension and re-admission should they fail to adhere to treatment 
appointments or other stipulations of their order. For these patients, "It is not necessary 
to believe that the individual has caused or suffered any particular harm before police 
custodial powers may be used to bring the person in for examination" (Hiltz and Szigeti 
2004, 273). It is sufficient that a risk of harm is perceived by a case worker or attending 
officer. Similarly, as I will argue based on Ontario's capacity to consent legislation and 
1
 Starson v. Swayze (1999) 22 Admin L.R. (3d) 211, par. 15 
2
 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, R.S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., as amended. 
3
 Mental Health Act, 1990, R.S.O. 1990, c. M, as amended. 
1 
case law, a mere risk of harm, either to the self or the public, is often sufficient grounds 
for making a determination of incapacity to consent. 
Justice Malloy's statement also highlights three principal concepts in contemporary 
society: freedom, autonomy and security. In this case, Justice Malloy is referring to 
security of the person against whom forced treatment is applied. However, within the 
broader context of a risk-averse society, security more frequently refers to security of the 
public from the psychiatric subject. One pertinent example of risk to the public at the 
hands of a person suffering from a psychiatric illness was the random shooting of Ottawa 
sports caster Brian Smith by Jeffrey Arenbourg in 1995. Arenbourg had been diagnosed 
with paranoid psychoses and had been released from the Royal Ottawa Hospital four 
years earlier, despite being found incapable of consenting to treatment. After much 
public debate and outcry, this tragic event became the catalyst for Bill 68, An Act in 
Memory of Brian Smith, to amend the Mental Health Act and the Health Care Consent 
Act (also referred to as "Brian's Law"), the legal instrument introducing community 
treatment orders. 
During the legislative debate on Brian's Law, the Honourable Brad Clark, Progressive 
Conservative member from Stoney Creek, stated: 
Brian's Law reflects our government's strong commitment to balancing 
individual rights with public safety. We're endeavouring to do that by 
providing appropriate care and treatment to those who pose a danger to 
themselves or to others. 
4
 Hansard, OLA, June 5, 2000. Accessed online April 25, 2006. http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/house-
proceedings/hansard_search.jsp?searchString=%22Brian%27s+law%22&go=Search&locale=en. 
2 
Toronto-based mental health attorneys Hiltz and Szigeti (2004) note that these legislative 
amendments had the effect of combining dangerousness and treatment capacity criteria. 
Previously, being found incapable of consenting to treatment was only an issue for 
patients who also met the criteria for involuntary committal, which was essentially that 
patients posed a: 
1. Risk of serious bodily harm to self; 
2. Risk of serious bodily harm to another person; or 
3. Risk of serious physical impairment of self (Hiltz and Szigeti 2004, 270). 
Following the amendments contained in Bill 68, the following additional criteria were 
added for involuntary committal: 
4. Risk of substantial mental deterioration; and 
5. Risk of substantial physical deterioration (Hiltz and Szigeti 2004, 270). 
Since involuntary committal criteria were expanded, these changes also expand the 
category of patients who could potentially be deemed incapable of consenting to 
treatment. 
Being found incapable of consenting to treatment now also affects patients who meet the 
criteria for Community Treatment Orders under section 33.1 of the Mental Health Act, 
1990. Additionally, incapacity to consent to treatment was made a condition upon which 
a patient may be made an involuntarily institutionalized patient under s. 20 (1.1) (e) of 
the Mental Health Act: 
s. 20(1.1): The attending physician shall complete a certificate of involuntary 
admission or a certificate of renewal if, after examining the patient, he or she is of 
the opinion that the patient: 
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(e) has been found incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 
1996, of consenting to his or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent 
of his or her substitute decision-maker has been obtained. 
The scope of governance over the incapable psychiatric subject is thus expanded allowing 
for greater surveillance and control over these patients. "Freedom of choice," I argue, is 
thereby restrained since the psychiatric subject is seen as unable to responsibly meet the 
conditions of that freedom; they are not able to care for themselves. This is not 
surprising given what Hunt and Wickham argue is "a steady advance of legal intervention 
into ever more spheres of social life" (1994, 70). 
In light of this, I argue that Ontario's laws and legal decisions regarding the 
determination of capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment highlight competing 
principles of neo-liberalism: The principles of freedom, autonomy, and security. David 
Harvey addresses a number of paradoxes of neo-liberal theory. He notes that while this 
doctrine supposedly champions individual freedom of choice, those choices are greatly 
limited to those aligned with the goals and strategies of neo-liberalism. Furthermore, this 
form of regulatory governance "creates the paradox of intense state interventions and 
government by elites and 'experts' in a world where the state is supposed not to be 
interventionist" (Harvey, 2005, 69). Surveillance and policing are multiplied in an 
endeavour to restore order and ensure security in a state dealing with the fallout of 
increasing marginalized populations (Harvey, 2005, 77). Expanding the means by which 
psychiatric subjects may have psychopharmaceutical treatments imposed upon them is an 
example of both of these contradictions. These provisions will place greater constraints 
4 
upon patients' freedom of self-determination while extending the governance of subjects 
deemed seriously mentally ill outside of institution walls and into the community. 
These principles of freedom, autonomy and security, however, need not be considered at 
odds. A determination of incapacity to consent to treatment can bring about freedom 
through wellness... freedom from debilitating symptoms and delusional thoughts. In this 
sense, imposed treatment compliance becomes a strategy aimed at producing a 
"responsibilized" psychiatric subject; responsible for their own health and security, and, 
as a consequence, the public's security as well. Through enforced treatment compliance, 
the incapable psychiatric subject, I argue, is brought in line with the doctrine of the 
"entrepreneurial subject." As Blackman observed in her study of subjects' voice hearing 
experiences, "I think we are witnessing the presence of the 'entrepreneurial self,' that is 
the self who is 'free to choose,' as being one of the key ways in which selfhood is 
understood" (2000, 56). That understanding, as Rose (1995) points out, is based upon 
particular assumptions about human agency - the "fiction of the autonomous self." This 
is an understanding of the self based in knowledges and practices of the "psy" sciences, 
such as psychiatry and psychology, which purport to authoritatively hold the "truth" 
about the self. Practices and strategies of governing are then based on this understanding 
of selfhood (Rose, 1995). 
Legal Governance of the Psychiatric Subject 
The present thesis examines the legal governance of psychiatric patients and their 
attempts to resist their incapable status. More specifically, it deals with psychiatric 
5 
patients in the province of Ontario who have been deemed incapable and who have 
applied for a review of their incapacity to consent status. These patients are all either 
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility or are subject to a community treatment 
order. Either way, they are required to take medication to control their psychiatric 
condition against their will. 
The scope of this study, however, only represents the "tip of the iceberg:" 
Historically, less than 10 per cent of applicants have been found capable by the 
Board on the issue of treatment. [...] Very few of these cases are ultimately heard 
and determined on appeal to the Superior Court; however, many more appeals are 
commenced without resolution for extended periods of time (Hiltz and Szigeti, 
2004, 162).5 
As Hiltz and Szigeti have determined, it is very rare, if patients even make an application, 
for the Consent and Capacity Board, the tribunal representing the patient's first line of 
defence, to overturn a physician's determination of incapacity. And, where a patient 
loses their case before the Board, very few of those cases ultimately make it to the appeal 
stage. There is however an importance to examining the texts of these Court and Board 
proceedings since the language and arguments contained therein provide cogent evidence 
of the knowledge produced concerning how and why a psychiatric patient is found to be 
incapable and what implications this has, not only for the patients, but what it says about 
our contemporary forms of governance in general. Following Hunt and Wickham's 
5
 In 2005, 1065 CTOs were issued for mentally ill people in Ontario—and they usually called for enforced 
medication. CBC. The Current. January 23rd, 2006. 
(http://www.cbc.ca/thecun-ent/2006/200601 /20060123.html Accessed March 15, 2007). 
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(1994) work on law as a form of governance, I argue that the determination of capacity to 
consent to treatment is a means of legal governance of the psychiatric subject. 
This thesis will explore the discursive production of the incapable psychiatric subject. As 
Hunt and Wickham point out, the legal and psychiatric professions are examples of "sites 
of production of knowledge" (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 13). The decisions rendered by 
Ontario's courts of law and the Consent and Capacity Board are evidence of the 
knowledge produced about the mental capacity of psychiatric patients. Legislation and 
case law, as Hunt and Wickharm argue, are evidence of social strategies (1994, 30). 
These texts, in turn, produce more knowledge about psychiatric subjects and inform 
future strategies. They are relied upon in subsequent legal actions. They are part of the 
discourse of mental incapacity and as such have very real effects upon those patients and 
our collective understanding and treatment (in both a general and medical sense) of 
individuals found to be incapable of forming consent. "Discourses have real effects; they 
are not just the way that social issues get talked and thought about. They structure the 
possibility of what gets included and excluded and of what gets done and remains 
undone" (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 11). 
My interest in the topic of the determination of capacity to consent, and its corollary, the 
psychiatric subject's right to refuse treatment, arose following media reports surrounding 
Scott Starson's case before the Supreme Court of Canada. After years of court battles 
before Ontario's Consent and Capacity Board, Superior Court and Court of Appeal, in 
2003 Canada's Supreme Court upheld the determination that he was capable of 
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consenting to the psychiatric treatment proposed to him. What this meant was that he 
retained the right to refuse the administration of the proposed medication. He did, 
however, remain an involuntary patient in a mental health facility. 
I was intrigued with the process by which a subject comes to be declared incapable of 
consenting to psychiatric treatment and thus loses the freedom to make choices about 
what procedures and medications will be administered to their body, since this stands in 
opposition to the principle of freedom viewed as so important to our current neo-liberal 
political rationalities. 
The current definition of capacity to consent in the jurisdiction of Ontario is found at 
Section 4 (1) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996: 
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a 
personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that 
is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal 
assistance service, as the case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision. 
What I sought to research was how this definition actually plays out in an adversarial 
situation, i.e., before the Board or the Courts. What constitutes an understanding of the 
information? What information is provided? How are "reasonable foreseeable 
consequences" considered? 
Faden and Beauchamp point out that questions of patient self-determination are a matter 
of weighing the risk of harm versus the possible benefits for the patient or the public 
(Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). This concept of balancing rights and risks was noted in 
8 
the case oiKirpiev v. Peat, "this is not an absolute right and requires a balancing process 
so as to ensure that the right is not lightly disregarded and that any limitations of the right 
take into consideration the risk of harm to the patient and the risk of harm to the public." 
It is a balance which must be carefully weighed, however, since "[fjew medical 
procedures are more intrusive than the forcible injection of powerful mind-altering drugs 
which are often accompanied by severe and sometimes irreversible side effects."7 
The definition of capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment must be viewed within the 
context of the social and legal history of informed consent, "competency" and "capacity." 
According to Faden and Beauchamp, "[t]he history of informed consent is rooted in 
multiple disciplines and social contexts, including those of the health professions, law, 
the social and behavioural sciences, and moral philosophy" (1986, 3). The medical, 
psychiatric and legal professions as well as the fields of philosophy and psychology have 
formulated competing and often incompatible perspectives on mental capacity. The 
concept of informed consent for psychiatric treatment is hence negotiated at the 
intersection of these disciplines. Carney also argues that the "boundary of competence 
involves many different disciplines and perspectives because at its base it is a social 
construct" (1997, 1). 
A prime feature of our dismantled welfare state is that health is understood as an 
individual responsibility. In this context, health risks come to be seen as diseases in and 
of themselves, to be avoided and cured (Nettleton, 1997). The psychiatric subject thus 
6
 Kirpiev v. Peat [2002] O.T.C. 488, par. 31, my emphasis. 
7
 Fleming v. Reid and Gallagher (1991) 4 O.R. (3d) 74 , par. 75b. 
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has a duty to avoid health risks by conforming with their proposed treatment as part of 
what Greco terms the "duty to be well" (1993). These discourses of rights, health, and 
self-governance come together under the doctrine of neo-liberalism. This current form of 
governance champions individual freedom, autonomy and rights against state 
intervention and paternalism (Lupton, 1999, 86). The following statement contained in a 
position paper on the topic of the capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment, prepared 
for the Toronto Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, exemplifies this neo-liberal 
approach: 
Individual rights are fundamental and guiding moral and legal principles in modern 
western democratic society. They have gradually displaced collective rights to 
assume a primacy unprecedented in history. Foremost amongst individual rights is 
the right to autonomy and the right to self-determination. For this reason, no 
treatment in medicine can be given without consent (Skorzewska, 2000, 1). 
The exception to this rule of informed consent lies where consent is not forthcoming due 
to a lack of capacity, most notably as a result of mental illness.8 The designation of a 
subject as incapable of consenting to treatment therefore creates a tension between the 
obligation of parens patriae (insuring care for those who cannot care for themselves), and 
the neo-liberal ideal of the self-governing subject. 
Within this context, social policies seek to reduce perceived social risks by engaging 
individuals in risk-avoiding behaviours. An example of this is contemporary mental 
health legislation based on reducing the risk of harm to patients and the public. As 
Brophy and McDermott point out, in the wake of deinstitutionalization there has been an 
increasing concern regarding the apparent risks posed by people with mental health 
problems living in the community. However, "these fears are often exaggerated, a 
8
 Starson v. Swayze [2003] S.C.R. 722, par. 7-9. 
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product of moral panics and media misrepresentations" (2003, S85). In response to these 
fears, laws governing compulsory community treatment have been introduced as a means 
of reducing the risk of violence psychiatric patients pose to society while maintaining 
their stated goal of having patients comply with medication directives in the least 
restrictive setting. Legislation providing for compulsory treatment in the community, or, 
community treatment orders, is the latest chapter in the debate over the governance of 
psychiatric subjects. These orders create are a legal instrument which compel the patient 
to comply with medication orders (Szigeti, 2001). Furthermore, critics of CTOs argue 
they are methods of coercion which erode patients' rights and are a way to circumvent 
the provision of effective public mental health services while forcing patients to take 
psychotropic medications, even though they are associated with numerous side effects, 
including death (O'Reilly, 2004). This poses particular problems since, as Laurance 
points out, patients may not receive adequate services in the community other than close 
surveillance regarding their medication consumption. In the U.K., Laurance argues, 
subsequent to a random killing by a psychiatric patient, the focus of mental health 
legislation became more concerned with public safety than with patient care (Laurance, 
2003). 
The underlying assumption informing this paper is that "risks" associated with both 
mental illness and mental capacity are socially constructed. Taking a social 
constructionist position means that what is considered a "risk" changes based on the 
norms, morals and beliefs at work in a given society at a given time (Lupton, 1999, 29). 
Moreover, risks are constituted within the discourses and knowledge systems surrounding 
11 
them. Therefore, the risks associated with mental illness, whether it be how subjects are 
defined as being "at risk" for mental illness, the risk of harm to the self or others which is 
associated with mental illness, or the risks and benefits of psychopharmaceutical 
treatments, are all discursively constituted. 
Thesis statement: 
The concept of capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment has emerged in accordance 
with the dominant understandings of mental pathology and autonomy at a given time and 
place. Capacity to consent is therefore a social construct contingent upon the prevailing 
legal, political, and psychiatric discourses that serve to negotiate its definition. Our 
present understanding of capacity to consent, as it is applied in legal decisions, 
corresponds to the neo-liberal concept of the autonomous, risk-adverse agent. 
Furthermore, the dominant discourse on capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment has 
shifted from being informed by a state's duty to care for those unable to care for 
themselves to being informed by notions of the entrepreneurial subject's "duty to be 
well." 
Research arguments: 
I argue that refusal to consent to treatment is itself taken as evidence of "a failure of the 
self to take care of itself (Greco, 1993, 361, emphasis in the original); a failure of reason 
that becomes conflated with the incapacity to consent to treatment. While mental health 
law in Ontario champions the value of autonomy, this conception of autonomy is akin to 
Rose's statement that we are not "free to choose but obliged to be free''' (1998, 17, 
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emphasis in the original). What gets played out here is the tension between notions of 
freedom and autonomy on one hand, and the production of intensely governed subjects 
on the other. By drawing on Foucault's governmentality approach (1991), I show that 
this legal discourse of autonomy is itself shaped by the prevailing psychiatric discourses 
constituting the autonomous subject. Psychiatric discourses perform a dual role here 
since they are at once crucial to the constitution of the self-regulating, risk-adverse agent, 
while employing a paternalistic approach that aims to normalize the behaviour of the 
"risky" psychiatric subject and legitimate the enforcement of psychiatric treatment 
compliance. 
I consider capacity to consent law to be an example of "law as governance" (Hunt and 
Wickham, 1994). It is a technique designed to bring about actions; those actions aim to 
produce a neo-liberal psychiatric subject: one increasingly made responsible for 
improving their condition. In order to meet the criteria of the neo-liberal psychiatric 
subject, one must adhere to a "duty to be well" (Greco, 1993) in following one's 
prescribed treatment - by force if necessary. 
The emergence of consent and capacity provisions in Ontario's mental health legislation 
will be traced in chapter one. Psychiatric committal and treatment considerations are 
currently governed by the Mental Health Act, 1990, as amended, and the Health Care 
Consent Act, 1996, as amended, respectively. Legislative changes reflect changes in the 
common-sense understanding of psychiatric subjects and changes in socio-political and 
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economic doctrine. The emphasis, I argue, moves from the state's duty of care to the 
subject's duty to be well. 
In chapter two I cover the theoretical perspectives informing this research, namely the 
governmentality perspective and the related genealogical approach. Several pertinent 
concepts are discussed here: Michel Foucault's work on power, knowledge, modes of 
objectification and governmentality, the saliency of "risk" and "truth" discourses, Nikolas 
Rose's contributions regarding the role of the "psy" sciences in constituting our 
contemporary notion of selfhood, and how our current doctrine of political and economic 
rationality, neo-liberalism, has emerged alongside and is intertwined with the above 
concepts. 
The third chapter presents the methodology I employ: a discourse analysis of written 
legal decisions. My reason for choosing Ontario as a jurisdiction is that Canada's leading 
case on capacity to consent {Starson v. Swayze ) emerged from this province and because 
this province has the greatest number of available written judicial decisions on capacity 
to consent to psychiatric treatment. I explain how this study forms part of a wider 
analytics of government and why I chose to follow Hunt and Wickham's (1994) method 
principles for a sociology of law as governance. My analysis of governance explores 
how knowledge (informed as it is by the "psy" sciences) is used in legal deliberations 
and, ultimately, in an attempt to reform the conduct of psychiatric subjects, i.e., to bring 
them in line with the ideal entrepreneurial self. In doing so, my goal is not to pronounce 
as to the correctness of the decisions taken but rather to provide an alternative prospective 
9
 Starson v. Swayze [2003] 304 N.R. 326 (SCC) 
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- one which examines psycho-legal questions from a sociological social-constructionist 
position. 
In chapters four, five and six I present my analysis of these judgments. I have broken the 
analysis down in accordance with the three main considerations taken in capacity 
decisions according to the Starson v. Swayze case: 1) the patient's insight into their 
condition, 2) the evidence of treatment effectiveness, and 3) the goals and consequences 
of treatment or lack of treatment. The patient's inability to articulate insight into their 
condition I view as a failure of meeting their "truth" obligation in line with the dominant 
psychiatric doctrine. This, I argue, is understood as a failure on the part of the patient to 
show an ability to engage in practices of self-knowledge and self-care. The evidence of 
treatment effectiveness I argue is also strongly held in line with the dominant psychiatric 
"brain disease" model (Fabris, 2006). The proposed treatments are presented as highly 
beneficial in the decisions in contrast to the way patients' concerns with their safety and 
benefit are downplayed as mere symbols of their "irrationality." Finally, the enunciated 
goals of treatments will be shown to change over the course of the history of capacity to 
consent legal challenges. 
In chapter seven I will present a conclusion of my findings and suggest directions for 
futur research. 
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Chapter One: The History of Capacity to Consent Law in Ontario: 
From "duty to care" to "duty to be well" 
We are presumed to have the capacity to manage our own property, to 
make our own decisions regarding treatment and disclosure of records, 
and to live freely where we choose. [...] Once we become sufficiently 
incapacitated that we or others are at serious risk of harm, the State owes 
us a duty to protect our interests and that of the community (Hiltz and 
Szigeti, 2004,1). 
The above statement highlights the delicate balancing act posed by the competing aims of 
capacity to consent law as a form of mental health governance. On one hand subjects 
have a right to determine what will be done to their bodies; on the other is the obligation 
to care for and protect the subject who is unable to care for themselves while also 
protecting the public. The concepts of "freedom," "autonomy," "choice," "risk of harm," 
and "duty to protect" are all challenged by the legislative policy and case law that 
determines the circumstances under which a subject may be deemed incapable of making 
treatment decisions. I argue that the contemporary legal history of mental incapacity can 
be mapped out alongside the emergence of our current neo-liberal form of governing in 
advanced liberal democracies. The notions of capacity to consent and the right to refuse 
psychiatric treatment have emerged alongside the production of the neo-liberal subject: 
one called upon to be a responsible, autonomous, entrepreneurial citizen. Yet, the subject 
deemed to be mentally incapable is set apart by virtue of (what gets viewed as) their 
inability to conform to the neo-liberal ideal. 
In this chapter I will map out the significant changes in capacity to consent legislation 
and jurisprudence and situate it within the North American context. While there have 
also been changes to the criteria by which patients may be involuntarily admitted to 
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psychiatric wards or independent psychiatric institutions, the focus will be on changes 
which have a direct impact on the question of whether the psychiatric subject may make 
their own treatment choices or have treatment forced upon them. I focus on forced 
treatment rather than forced admittance (or committal) since forcing a patient to undergo 
treatment strongly compels the psychiatric subject to comply with the neo-liberal "duty to 
be well." 
Changes in Ontario's capacity to consent legislation emerged alongside the historical 
transformation of the concept of mental illness and the role of psychiatric expertise. 
Mental health professionals gained prestige and legitimacy as the understanding of 
mental illness shifted from that of a stigmatized condition to a more pervasive malady. 
These legislative moves also reflect changes in alignment with successive political 
rationalities, from the paternalism of the welfare state to the autonomous subject of neo-
liberalism. In the case of the legal governance of the psychiatric subject, the "freedom to 
choose" is pitted against the neo-liberal "[tendancy] to favour governance by experts and 
elites" (Harvey, 2005, 66). Policies, legislation, and judicial decisions have increased 
patient autonomy yet they have also expanded the field of governance by psychiatric 
experts. With the advent of community treatment orders (CTOs) in 2000, forced 
treatment now not only affects involuntarily admitted patients but has expanded, in 
certain cases, to those living in the community as well. Furthermore, as I will argue, the 
"freedom to choose" where psychiatric treatment is concerned, remains strictly limited to 
those who show capacity for freedom. Capacity for self-discipline and self-care on the 
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part of the psychiatric subject are the conditions of possibility whereby that freedom to 
choose may be granted. 
Capacity to Consent Case Law in the North American Context 
In the U.S., the principle of the right to self-determination by way of protection against 
physical intrusion by physicians was enshrined by Justice Cordoza in 1914. In the 
landmark Schloendorff case he stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is 
liable in damages."10 By specifying that persons of "sound mind" possessed a right to 
self-determination, a division was set up where the same rights and protections were not 
extended to those of "unsound mind" (James, 2002, 4). This division paved the way for a 
debate over where the boundary would be drawn as to which persons this right would 
extend to. 
Only in recent decades has there been "a legally defined means for determining 
competency to give informed consent" (Zapf and Roesch, 2005, 232). The question of 
obtaining informed consent from an involuntary patient for psychiatric treatment was first 
tested in a 1979 U.S. federal court case. In Rogers v. Department of Mental Health, x' 
the court ruled that "mental patients have the right to refuse the drugs and seclusion 
ordered by their physicians on the grounds that patients have a constitutional right to 
decide what happens to them in reference to psychiatric treatment" (Cockerham, 2000, 
10
 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105N.E. 92 (1914). 
11
 Rogers v. Department of Mental Health, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (1979). 
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316). The argument brought by the attorneys for the plaintiffs was that the right to refuse 
treatment centred upon the risk of potential harm posed by the drugs. Two years later, a 
U.S. federal appeals court held in Rennie v. Klein that persons who are not committed 
to a mental institution have the right to refuse medication (Cockerham, 2000, 317). 
In the Canadian context, a legal definition of informed consent to medical treatment was 
established as the result of two 1980 Supreme Court of Canada decisions, Reibl v. 
Hughes1 and Hopp v. Lepp. According to this definition, 
1. The consent must relate to the treatment. 
2. The consent must be informed. 
3. The consent must be given voluntarily. 
4. The consent must not be obtained through misrepresentation or fraud 
(Hoffman, 1997, 8). 
From this point forward, physicians had a legal obligation to reveal to patients 
information "about the nature, expected benefits, and material risks and side effects of the 
treatment; alternative courses of action; and likely consequences of not having the 
treatment" (Hoffman, 1997, 8). 
Competency to consent was first defined in Ontario legislation under the 1978 Mental 
Health Act as "having the ability to understand the subject matter in respect of which 
consent is requested and able to appreciate the consequences of giving or withholding 
consent" (Burra, Kimberley and Miura, 1980, 251). This definition was later interpreted 
12
 Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 1981). 
13
 Reibl v. Hughes (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1 S.C.C. 
14
 Hopp v. Lepp (1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 67 S.C.C. 
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in Howlett v. Karanaratne (1988).15 According to this case, the criteria for mental 
competency was as follows: 
A person is not "mentally competent" unless that person: 
(1) Has the ability to understand the nature of the illness for which the 
treatment is proposed; 
(2) Has the ability to understand the treatment proposed; and 
(3) Is able to appreciate the consequences of giving or withholding 
consent (Schneider, 1996, 98). 
The patient's failure to appreciate the existence of their mental illness soon became a key 
criteria by which competence to consent to treatment was determined, as evidenced by 
this 1989 Superior Court decision: 
The Board's decision that the appellant was not mentally competent to 
consent to treatment was confirmed where the appellant denied the 
existence of her illness, and therefore could not be taken to understand the 
consequences of giving or withholding consent (Schneider, 1996, 98).16 
Since denial of disorder and, hence, denial of need for treatment, is symptomatic of 
mental disorder itself according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association, this creates a circular argument by which treatment refusal is 
taken as evidence of mental incapacity and, hence, a need to enforce treatment (Dellaire 
et al, 2000). 
Capacity to Consent Legislation in Ontario: 
The first legislation governing mental health in Ontario was the British County Asylums 
Act of 1813. That act vested control of mental institutions in the hands of physicians, 
except for the powers to admit and discharge patients, which were in the hands of the 
15
 Howlett v. Karanaratne (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 418 (Dist. Ct). 
16
 McKay v. O'Doherty (June 1, 1989), Doc. No. Thunder Bay 4768/89 (Ont. Dist. Ct). 
17
 For example under DSM-III-R (1987) under "Mood Disorders" it is noted, "Frequently the person does 
not recognize that he or she is ill and resists all efforts to be treated" (p. 216). 
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courts (Bay, 2004, 4). Law and psychiatry have therefore been intertwined in the 
governance of persons with psychiatric disorders in this province since pre-
Confederation. In 1850, the first asylum in the province opened in Toronto at the site of 
what is now the Addiction and Mental Health Services Corporation (previously named 
the Queen Street Mental Health Centre). Over the course of the following century, the 
province's psychiatric hospitals "provided treatment, shelter, asylum and custody for the 
seriously mentally ill, criminals, the homeless and other marginalized members of 
society." The alignment between mental illness, criminality, homelessness, and 
marginalization, however, as I will expand upon in my case-law analysis, continues to 
this day. 
Amy James argues that the early history of Ontario's mental health legislation can best 
be categorized as "unbalanced." Examining mental health law and services for the years 
1945 to 1970, she concludes that successive legislative changes "not only reinforced a 
sense of professionalization and power, but neglected to address issues of competency, 
consent, and the limitation of the authority of mental health professionals in favour of the 
patients" (James, 2002, 3). Despite the existence of the Nuremberg Code,19 both mental 
health legislation and practitioners continued to ignore or avoid the principle of informed 
consent. However, as this review of Ontario's mental health policy will suggest, the legal 
discourse on capacity to consent to treatment paved the way for the extension of informed 
18
 Newman, Dan. 1998. Mental Health: Beyond 2000: Strengthening Ontario's mental health system. A 
report on the consultative review of mental health reform in the province of Ontario. Accessed online April 
25, 2006. http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/mentalreform.htmI 
1
 A set of 10 principles for human experimentation introduced further to the Doctors' Trial of 1947, 
convicting Nazi war doctors of committing inhumane experimentation. Among the principles contained 
therein was the necessity of obtaining informed consent in the absence of coercion. Accessed online 
October 30, 2007. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Code. 
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consent rights to mental health patients despite a long history of resistance on the part of 
psychiatric practitioners. 
The Pre-War Era: New Psy Technologies and the "Mentally-Defective" Detainee 
The 1930s saw the introduction of the first of a new line of radical treatments being 
administered in Canada.20 Insulin coma therapy was first used in Toronto in 1937, and 
was at that time limited to women patients. "Typically, when new treatments were 
introduced women were selected as the guinea pigs" (Simmons, 1990, 16). This was 
followed by a brief experiment with Metrazol shock therapy, despite evidence that it 
caused "compression fractures of the spine" (Simmons, 1990, 18). By 1943 hospitals 
were directed to cease Metrazol therapy since this treatment would be replaced by newly-
purchased electroshock machines. These treatments were administered as a matter of 
course without seeking consent (Simmons, 1990). 
During the 1940s, there was legal uncertainty regarding whether or not electroshock and 
insulin coma therapy could be administered without a relative's consent. For lobotomies, 
however, the law required the written consent either of the patient or of his legally 
constituted representative since a lobotomy was considered a surgical procedure. Despite 
this legal requirement, the law also permitted the superintendent of provincial psychiatric 
hospitals to act as the "committee to the patient" and, as such, "could direct the course of 
The use of drug treatments in psychiatry had, however, commenced some forty years earlier. In the 
1890's Emil Kraepelin coined term 'pharmacopsychology' to describe the new turn to drugs (Healy, 2002, 
21) 
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treatment of the patient" (Simmons, 1990, 213).21 Thus, paternalistic powers were 
routinely exercised, overriding the wishes of both patients and caregivers. 
The Mental Hospitals Act of 1935 reflected the social conceptions of mental illness as 
well as the paternalistic tendency of the pre-war era. '"Community values' and the morals 
of the era dictated to a large extent whether behaviour could be considered within or 
outside of the norm" (James, 2002, 5). The language and spirit of the law tends to equate 
mental illness with deviance and criminality. Under this Act, powers to confine the 
subject to the psychiatric institution are vested with both psychiatrists and law 
enforcement. "Certification" (or, the declaration of "insanity") resulted when any two 
physicians examined a person and certified in writing their conclusion that the person 
was indeed mentally ill (Bay, 2004, 2). As for the powers of police, the Act stated "[a]ny 
person apparently mentally ill or mentally defective and conducting himself in a manner 
which in a normal person would be disorderly, may be apprehended without a warrant by 
any constable or officer of the peace and detained" (James, 2002, 5). The normalizing 
power of mental health law in Ontario was thus firmly entrenched. 
The Post-War Era: The Medical Model and Psychiatric Dominance 
The Post-War era was one in which psychiatry attempted to gain public acceptance and 
prestige by over-emphasizing the prevalence of mental health problems. Following the 
1943 report entitled Psychiatry Under Health Insurance, those responsible for mental 
health policy in Ontario were quoted as saying: "It would probably be fair to say that 50 
21
 Lobotomies were eventually banned with the amendments to the Mental Health Act in 1978, nearly 
twenty years after the introduction of neuroleptic medications (Simmons, 1990). 
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percent of patients visiting doctors' offices are not exclusively cases of physical illness 
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but have psychological problems as well" (cited in Simmons, 1990, 36). 
Along with the attempt to further legitimate psychiatric authority came increased 
paternalism on the part of practitioners and administrators. This was evident in the 
emerging discourse which linked treatment refusal with mental illness. By the late 
1940s, there was clear indication that refusal to consent was considered evidence of the 
existence of mental illness. In 1948 Dr. Stokes of the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital was 
quoted as saying "it was quite plain that if a voluntary patient refuses to accept a 
recognized form of treatment which is recommended, his status as a voluntary patient is 
open to question" (cited in Simmons, 1990, 25). Treatment refusal was thus associated 
with being unreasonable - and by association, insane - therefore, upon treatment refusal, 
a voluntary patient could find herself committed to an institution. This association 
legitimated the division between reason/non-reason, whereby madness has historically 
been understood as the absence of reason (Foucault, 1965, ix). Furthermore, the voices 
of the "sound" mind were legitimated over the voices of the "unsound" (Fabris, 2006). 
Not only was paternalism evident in the administration of psychiatric hospitals, but the 
use of psychiatric treatments as a method of patient control was as well, as this quote 
from one superintendent suggests: 
Our first thought was to give lobotomies to the chronically assualtive, destructive 
and soiling group of patients that more or less regularly had to be secluded. Our 
thought was that we probably might not be able to get too many of these patients 
22
 Psychiatry Under Health Insurance, Draft of Report to be made to the Special Committee on Social 
Security on May 18, 1943. 
23
 AO, RG 10, HS 1-2, Box 50, Minutes, Superintendents' Conference, January 23, 1948. 
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out of hospital, but we would create an easier nursing situation in the hospital 
(cited in Simmons, 212).24 
In keeping with an over-emphasis of the prevalence of mental illness, there was an effort 
on the part of psychiatrists to have their facilities moved from large, over-crowded 
provincial mental institutions into wards situated within general hospitals on the premise 
that their status and salaries would rise accordingly (Simmons, 1990). By 1957 however, 
their situation had still not changed, with the bulk of funding for mental health remaining 
in the large institutions. A report published in this year entitled More for the Mind by the 
Tyhust Committee, a group of mental health professionals, was an illustration of the 
dominance of the medical model in psychiatry at this time. Their "solution was to reveal 
the truth to the medical and political community, to show them that mental illness was 
everywhere and that it was the psychiatrist, above all, who was best equipped to deal with 
it" (Simmons, 1990, 92).25 
A series of legislative amendments to the Mental Hospitals Act did however reflect the 
dominance of psychiatry. In 1952, changes were made to increase the powers of the 
Superintendent, such that "during confinement, the Superintendent maintained control 
over one's custody and care. Treatment, restraint, and examinations all remained subject 
to the Superintendent's approval, eliminating the possibility of refusal by a patient" 
(James, 2002, 5). 
24
 Archives of Ontario - AO, RG 10, B. 115, Gen. P-2-8-2, December 15, 1958, J.N. Senn, superintendent 
Ontario Hospital, Hamilton, to Dr. B. McNeel Chief, Mental Health Division. 
25 
Among other recommendations included in the report were that all aspects of psychiatric services 
including administration and budgeting be entrusted to psychiatrists, that psychiatric hospital sizes be 
greatly restricted, that more units be opened in or near general hospitals (Simmons, 1990: 94). 
25 
By 1960, the Mental Hospitals Act extended the authority of the Superintendent to 
"whomever the Superintendent delegated to act in hospital affairs" (James, 2002, 5). 
Furthermore, it reduced from two to one the number of medical practitioners needed to 
observe and detain individuals. In the absence of medical practitioners, the 
Superintendent could simply detain an individual himself. If the person remained 
detained for thirty days, that patient could then be certified as mentally ill, which could 
lead to indefinite detention. Furthermore, voluntary patients could no longer discharge 
themselves, and, even when patients were discharged by the Superintendent, their 
personal affairs and administration of their estate were placed in the hands of a Public 
Trustee (James, 2002, 6). These amendments therefore strengthened the authority of 
psychiatric superintendents, extending their powers over the lives of those determined to 
be mentally ill. 
The "neuroleptic" 60's - An Era of Contradictions: Patients Rights and 
Dangerousness: Deintitutionalization and Bureaucratization 
The 1950s and early 60s also saw the emergence of a new class of psycho-
pharmaceuticals - neuroleptics, such as chlorpromazine. Sold under the brand name 
Thorzine, psychiatric hospitals quickly turned to this as their drug of choice following its 
release in 1955 (Healy, 2002). It has been argued that changes in legislation brought 
about in the mid-1960s geared toward extending patient's rights were partly the result of 
the advent of these new anti-psychotic medications and the realization that they could 
carry harmful secondary effects (Bay, 2004, 2; Draper and Dawson, 1990, 285). 
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The Canadian Mental Health Association's concern with patient's rights has historically 
been countered by a desire to extend its paternalistic powers. Beginning in 1964, the 
association produced reports which proposed changes to mental health legislation which 
were "aimed at achieving two apparently contradictory objectives: to facilitate the 
apprehension, examination and committal of certain classes of mentally ill people, but 
also to protect their civil liberties through the establishment of hospital review boards" 
(Simmons, 1990,226). 
By 1965, legislative changes aimed at strengthening patients' rights began to appear. For 
example, the 1965 Mental Hospitals Act made it possible for voluntary patients to leave 
at their will (James, 2002). The 1966 Mental Health Act required that inquiries be made 
into the use of any restraints and the reasons therefore. A review process was also set up 
whereby designated family or friends could ask for an examination into the need for 
ongoing detention of an involuntary patient (James, 2002). At this point, however, 
anyone admitted was also assumed to be incompetent (Draper and Dawson, 1990, 286). 
The Late '60s: Bureaucracy and Dangerousness 
The late 1960s saw the advent of both the insertion of dangerousness criteria for 
involuntary committals and the bureaucratization of mental health policy. Changes to the 
Mental Health Act inl967 and 1968 consolidated several earlier amendments to the 
legislation and reflected both a changing view of mental illness and an undertaking to 
extend patients' rights. Changes also reflected concerns with "safety" and 
"dangerousness." The primary change was one of language - from describing subjects as 
27 
"mentally ill" or "mentally defective" to having a "mental disorder." The aim here was 
to attempt to remove the stigma associated with mental disorders.26 Before 1967, patients 
were detained on the premise that their welfare needed protection, whereas under the 
1967 Mental Health Act, safety became the standard criteria. To be defined as an 
involuntary patient, the subject had to meet the requirement of being diagnosed with a 
mental disorder and hospitalization must be necessary "to ensure the safety of the patient 
or others" (James, 2002, 6). However, changing a patient's status from voluntary or 
informal to involuntary was still a matter of simply completing the required paper work. 
Furthermore, the right of patients to refuse treatment was still without legal support 
(James, 2002). 
The 1967 Mental Health Act also ushered in an era of bureaucratization in Ontario's 
mental health field. Following the passage of this Act, the number of civil servants 
working in the mental health bureaucracy increased from a handful of members to nearly 
90 (Simmons, 1990, 143). The Act also placed responsibility for mental health policy 
with the mental health division of the Department of Health. At the same time, the 
Department of Health "modernized its administrative and accounting system so as to 
better monitor and control expenditures and management procedures throughout the 
province" (Simmons, 1990, 43). Non-medical administrators were placed at the head of 
provincial mental hospitals, assisted by medical directors. As Simmons notes, "[t]he 
decision to employ generalists who would take a corporate view within ministries led to a 
26
 Subversive terminology continues to be used to describe persons considered suffering from a 'mental 
disorder.' Reume notes a headline in The Globe and Mail from the 1998 inquest into the shooting of 
Edmund Yu by Toronto police entitled "Mentally ill called ioons' on the job" (2002, 405). Persons with a 
psychiatric history self-identify as "psychiatric survivor" or "consumer/survivor" (Reume, 2002). 
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search for bureaucrats with management or administrative training" (Ibid.). Here we find 
the beginnings of neo-liberal ideals being implemented in mental health policy since 
there was now an emphasis on accountability and cost-effectiveness associated with 
mental health care while simultaneously increasing the ranks of administrative expertise. 
The insertion of dangerousness criteria in the Mental Health Act was first proposed in 
1964 but only came into effect in the 1968 Mental Health Act. Pursuant to this act, in 
order to be committed, it would now be necessary to show that "a person is probably 
mentally ill and a danger to himself and others and in need of medical attention" 
(Simmons, 1990, 227, emphasis in original). Persons could now only be committed 
involuntarily on the basis of both illness and dangerousness to themselves or others. 
However, in a movement to increase the rights of patients, the Act also established a 
tribunal to review commitment orders (Bay, 2004). These changes put an end to the 
procedure of certification and eliminated the possibility of lifetime committal without 
review. 
The 1968 Act also removed the powers of police officers and judges to order detention 
without a psychiatric evaluation, thus placing some restrictions on legal authority. A 
psychiatric evaluation was now essential, and, after having previously been increased to a 
two-physician authorization requirement, involuntary committal now required only the 
signature of one physician (Ibid.). The result was that committal powers were now 
placed in the hands of a single psychiatrist. The Act thus in one respect increases 
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psychiatric authority while at the same time putting in place a series of safeguards by way 
of a review process. 
1960s - 1970s: Deinstitutionalization and the emerging "revolving door 
syndrome" 
The advent of psychopharmaceuticals finally made possible the deinstitutionalization 
mental health professionals began calling for in the 1950s. The 1964 Royal Commission 
on Health Services called for the transfer of all patients receiving care from mental 
hospitals to general hospitals (Wasylenki, Goering and Macnaughton, 1992). As a result, 
the number of beds in Canadian psychiatric hospitals decreased from 47,633 to 15,011 
between 1960 and 1976, while the capacity of general hospitals psychiatric units 
increased from 844 to 5,836 during the same period (Ibid, 199). These general hospital 
spots served the needs of less severely ill patients while patients with more severe mental 
disorders remained in the psychiatric hospitals, thus creating a two-tier system. 
However, while the new medications were helpful in reducing or controlling symptoms, 
there was a lack of adequate community services for those patients being discharged. 
The result was the "revolving door syndrome" where these patients would eventually 
need to be readmitted.27 It would not be until the year 2000, with the introduction of 
community treatment orders, that a solution would be introduced to this "revolving door 
syndrome." 
Newman, Dan. 1998. Mental Health: Beyond 2000: Strengthening Ontario's mental health system. A 
report on the consultative review of mental health reform in the province of Ontario. Accessed online April 
25, 2006. http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/mentalreform.htmI 
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Late 70s - Early 80s: From Dangerousness to Risk: The Emergence of Consent 
to Treatment Legislation 
The next major wave of mental health reform occurred from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s. According to Gilbert Sharpe, a consultant to the Ministry of Health, as late as 
1975 doctors still assumed that they had the power to forcibly treat patients against their 
will and rarely sought consent. When he challenged their treatment procedures he was 
met with hostility. This led Sharpe to draft a statement of principle for further proposed 
changes to the Mental Health Act stating in effect that physicians "cannot treat patients 
against their will" (Simmons, 1990, 230). Physicians steadfastly resisted any perceived 
challenges to their authority and resented the possibility of being referred to a review 
board before imposing treatment (Simmons, 1990). 
Simmons argues that the era commencing in the late 1970s was one of decreasing 
psychiatric authority and increasing patients' rights. However, changes to the MHA in 
1978 actually expanded the criteria under which a patient could be involuntarily 
committed. The 1978 Mental Health Act altered the committal criteria to allow 
"committal if a patient suffered from a mental disorder of a nature or quality likely to 
result in serious bodily harm to the patient or others or imminent and serious physical 
impairment to the patient" (Bay, 2004, 3). Committal was now based upon the risk of 
bodily harm or physical impairment rather than the stricter "safety" or "dangerousness" 
criteria. 
The 1978 Mental Health Act was part of a movement across North America to reduce 
civil commitment. However, these legislative changes, along with the majority of other 
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jurisdictions in the U.S. and Canada, had the opposite effect; civil commitment levels 
actually increased. "In the five years prior to 1978, involuntary admissions in Ontario 
fell by 35% but rose by 51% in the subsequent five years, and by 1986/87 had increased 
125% above the 1978 level" (Draper and Dawson, 1990, 287). With the introduction of 
new drugs, many patients were in a position to leave the facilities. However, once they 
had left, they would fail to follow their treatment, thus the recidivism rate was high 
(Weisstub, 1990, 319). Jeremy Laurance points to the conclusions of a number of studies 
in Britain, where a similar trend in increased psychiatric admissions was found. He 
argued that the increases were more a reflection of the public's fear of the risk of violence 
posed by the mentally ill and the mental health care system's reaction to that fear (2003, 
4-6).28 
Defining "mental competency" 
Another landmark change was that the 1978 Act finally defined mental competency: 
"having the ability to understand the subject matter in respect of which consent is 
requested and able to appreciate the consequences of giving or withholding consent" 
(Burra, Kimberley and Miura, 1980, 251). Competency was thus a two-part test, both 
parts of which must be passed for a patient to be deemed competent to consent to 
treatment. However, section 12 of the 1978 Mental Health Act set out the procedure to 
override treatment refusals for involuntary patients. Under this legislation, even when 
determined to be competent to give consent, if consent was not forthcoming, a treatment 
refusal could be overturned upon a physician's request before the Board. 
28
 Data on Canadian involuntary psychiatric admission rates has not been compiled for over 20 years 
(Crisanti and Love, 2001, 399). 
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The enactment of a means of defining and determining competency to consent to 
treatment in the legislation is generally viewed as an advance in patient's rights. 
However, Burra et al. noted the affront to patients' rights posed by the override 
provisions. 
Presumably the social policy behind this provision is that the involuntary 
patient should not be allowed to put the public in a position where that 
patient continues to require hospitalization because of his dangerousness 
and continues to sap public resources by his refusal to consent to treatment 
when treatment is available that would render him no longer dangerous 
(Burra etal., 1980,252). 
Thus, this legislation compelled the dangerous psychiatric patient to treatment as a means 
of reducing the costs associated with treatment non-compliance. It provided a rationality 
by which psychiatric patients were to be transformed into responsible, cost-saving, safe 
citizens. Where a treatment was available, refusing to consent to that treatment was seen 
as irresponsible, unreasonable and a burden to the public and the mental health care 
system. The compliant patient is, in other words, considered the "good patient" (Lupton, 
1997) and the non-compliant patient is evidently the "bad patient." 
1980s: Post-Charter Mental-Health Legislation 
The impetus for reform in the 1980s arose from the passage of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, the emergence of patient advocacy and rights organizations, and 
public criticisms aimed at the provincial government. By the start of the 1980s, issues 
such as the lack of affordable housing for former psychiatric patients became a public 
concern. A series of deaths and reports of mistreatment of mental health patients added 
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to the outcry. Simmons argues that passing a law increasing rights in certain situations 
was a way to respond to these concerns and criticisms without actually incurring 
additional financial burdens for the provincial government. It was also "a subtle way for 
government to reduce the political influence of psychiatrists whose power, like any 
profession, depends partly on status and prestige" (Simmons, 1990, 235). 
Michael Bay, former chairman of the Consent and Capacity Board, points to the 
resistance shown by psychiatric professionals whenever they perceived legislation was 
intended to reduce their powers. For example, he notes the 1978 changes to the 
committal criteria brought proclamations that "the new law tied their hands by only 
allowing them to commit persons who were of immanent and catastrophic risk to the 
public" (2004, 5). Furthermore, after the Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office was created 
in 1983, at first "clinicians and hospital administrators feared and loathed the advocacy 
office" (ibid.). He speaks of the "mythology" of mental health legislation in Ontario, 
whereby the media, attorneys, practitioners and the right-wing government, consistently 
"misunderstand and misrepresent" mental health law provisions. For example, Bay 
notes, "[rjespected newspapers ran angry editorials under banner headlines demanding 
the repeal of provisions that did not exist" (2004, 5). The effect was to represent mental 
health law in Ontario as a risk to a public fearful of the mentally ill and psychiatric 
patients. The psychiatric subject was thus presented as a risk to public security. 
In 1981 Ontario established the first Canadian psychiatric patient advocate office in response to a series 
of deaths which occurred during 1980-81 at the Queen Street Mental Health Centre (Simmons, 1990: 232). 
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This is not surprising given the tendency of popular media to depict the mentally ill as 
violent and dangerous (Olstead, 2002). In a discourse analysis of portrayals of mental 
illness in Canadian newspapers, Olstead found that mental illness was regularly conflated 
with criminality. Furthermore, his study suggests that this conflation is based on popular 
notions of agency and responsibility. Mental illness is seen as something which subjects 
have the ability to control (i.e., by getting better) even while their actions are described as 
irrational and delusional (2002, 641). The entrepreneurial subject is thus always assumed 
- even in the face of irrational and delusional behaviour. 
A number of changes needed to be made to the Mental Health Act in order to bring it in 
line with the Charter's rights and liberties provisions. Debates over legislative changes 
centred on the inclusion of override powers for the Review Board. This debate pitted the 
psychiatric and medical community, who argued for the restoration of the provisions, 
against psychologists, social workers, mental health advocates and self-help groups, who 
were opposed to the provisions. The final draft contained an override provision only for 
those decisions made by the substitute decision maker, and not for those made by 
competent involuntary patients (Simmons, 1990). 
Psychiatric literature commenting on the passage of Bill 7 in 1986 and Bill 190 in 1987, 
each amending the Mental Health Act, highlighted the resistance by psychiatric experts to 
extending treatment decision freedoms. Psychiatric researchers argued that Bill 7 would 
lead to an increased number of patients "with potentially treatable disorders" discharging 
themselves against medical advice (Fernando et al., 1990, 79). Draper and Dawson 
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argued "[t]he attempt to subject the irrationality of psychotic illness to the due process of 
rational laws has caused problems" (1990, 285). They go on to state (though without 
explaining the source of their evidence) that members of the public are "shocked and 
indignant when they discover that doctors are prohibited by law from treating some 
persons who are to them obviously disturbed by mental illness" (Ibid.). These comments 
suggest two things. First, that the law is legitimated as rational while subjugating the 
irrational knowledge held by the psychotic subject. Second, they uphold the belief in the 
patient's duty to be well and the physician's duty to treat. Laurance would counter that 
this is indicative of a system run by fear: 
Unlike prisoners, [involuntary patients] have been forced to accept treatment, 
including drugs and ECT, which in any other circumstances would amount to an 
assault. This is the clearest measure of a system driven by fear - fear of what 
these people may do to themselves or others (2003, 4). 
They are also in keeping with the prevailing assumption, pointed out by Verdun-Jones, 
that involuntary psychiatric patients are all mentally incompetent (1988). 
The 1990s - Harris's "Commonsense Revolution" 
In 1992 the N.D.P. government passed four Acts - The Consent to Treatment Act, 1992 
(from the Ministry of Health), The Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 (from the Ministry of 
Citizenship), The Advocacy Act, 1992 (from the Ministry of the Attorney General), and 
the Consent and Capacity Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992, which repealed the Mental 
Incompetency Act and necessitated amendments to 26 other pieces of legislation, 
including the Mental Health Act. These legislative changes were only proclaimed as of 
April 1, 1995, just before the N.D.P. lost power in the subsequent election to the 
Progressive Conservatives. The Harris government then proceeded with a series of what 
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I will refer to as "roll-back" and "roll-out" legislative changes - corresponding to Peck 
and Tickel's periodization of neo-liberalism. The "roll-back" phase refers to the 
dismantling and deregulation of forms of state welfare while the "roll-out" phase refers to 
new forms of institutions and regulatory strategies in line with neo-liberal doctrine (Keil, 
2002, 580-581). During the "roll-back" phase of legislative changes, the Conservatives 
immediately repealed The Advocacy Act, replaced the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992 
with the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and made further amendments to the related 
legislation (Hoffman, 1997). Then, beginning in 1995, the Conservative government 
"rolled out" a series of funding announcements aimed at establishing and enhancing 
"case management, community treatment teams, and crises response services" (Newman, 
1998, online). 
The Health Care Consent Act, 1996, established the current Consent and Capacity 
Review Board, before which patients may challenge their incapable status. The Board is 
invested with the authority to pronounce decisions in disputes between health care 
professionals, patients, and substitute decision makers, "whether they involve end of life 
decisions by adult children for an elderly relative or a decision by the parents of a young 
child to forbid the use of blood products in life and death situations" (Bay, 2004, 5). 
Bay notes that while the Health Care Consent Act has brought about improvements to the 
degree to which informed consent to treatment is sought, there remains resistance in the 
psychiatric profession to its implementation. 
30
 See for example Sheena B., Re (1995) 176 N.R. 161 (SCC) for a discussion of religious freedom and 
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Many practitioners appear to ignore or misunderstand the rules for consent to 
treatment. Just as before, if a patient does not resist treatment, he or she is likely 
to be treated without any consideration being given to the question of capacity. 
Clinicians, by and large, do not understand that there is no such thing as global 
competence or incompetence. Many do not understand the presumption of 
capacity" (Bay, 2004, 8). 
Changes between the Consent to Treatment Act, 1992 and the Health Care Consent Act, 
1996 were designed to "reduce treatment delays" and "strengthen the role of the family," 
including making "it easier for family members to assume decision-making authority for 
loved ones" and removing "barriers for making or using powers of attorney" (Hoffman, 
1997, xx). The Advocacy Act, 1992 was repealed because it was seen as an unnecessary 
expense, excessively bureaucratic, and symbolic of "the 'paranoid' stance of the patient 
advocacy" (Ibid.). 
Hoffman, a mental health law commentator, noted: 
The new legislation reflects the expectation of the civil and legal rights in 
contemporary society as expressed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, including freedom and the principles of natural justice, as well 
as ethical values that should exist in health care, such as respect for each 
person and individual autonomy. The capable person is given the right to 
make decisions over his or her life and the incapable person is to be given 
help to be as independent as possible (1997, xxi). 
The principles enshrined in post-Charter mental health legislation are thus aligned with 
the neo-liberal principles of individual autonomy, independence and the sanctity of the 
rule of law. 
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2000 and Beyond: Community Treatment Orders and the "Duty to be Well" 
The latest chapter in the history of the concept of capacity to consent to treatment is the 
community treatment order (CTO), also referred to as compulsory community treatment. 
Although CTOs were introduced as early as the 1970s in the US, and are now found in 
some 41 states, in Canada, CTO legislation was first passed in Saskatchewan in 1995 
(O'Brien and Farrell, 2005, 27). In Ontario, the introduction of CTOs was noted to be the 
"single most hotly contested event in the mental health legislative history of this 
province" (Szigeti, 2001). In the year 2000, amendments were made to Ontario's mental 
health laws in line with those in other Western democracies. The most controversial of 
these changes was the inclusion of CTO provisions, whereby the patient receives 
supervised compulsory treatment while remaining in the community. The addition of 
CTO provisions was accompanied by a move to expand "risk-of-harm"-based 
commitment criteria and to include criteria based on the "need for treatment" (Hiltz and 
Szigeti, 2004). 
The consultation process for these legislative changes began in 1998 when Dan Newman, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, was mandated by the Minister of 
Health, Elizabeth Witmer, to conduct a review of mental health reform. He met with 
some 89 specified groups, individuals and organizations and received comments from an 
additional 100 sources. Those consulted included the Coalition of Ontario Psychiatrists, 
Michael Bay, Chair of the Ontario Review Board, the Chief Coroner, the Ontario 
Psychological Association, Anita Szigeti of the Mental Health Legal Committee, various 
mental health services centres, as well as consumer/survivor advocacy groups and self-
39 
help groups. The report based on those consultations, Mental Health: 2000 and Beyond: 
Strengthening Ontario's Mental Health System, made key recommendations for 
implementing reforms aimed at increasing funding, increasing and improving services, 
and focusing on "accountability, outcome measures, evidence-based research, and 
evaluation."31 In terms of legislative amendments, Newman concluded that any new 
legislation must meet these fundamental principles: 
• That legislation supports our government's creation of an 
integrated and coordinated mental health system capable of 
providing a continuum of care from prevention to in-hospital and 
community-based treatment; 
• That legislation allows those who need mental health services in 
Ontario to access those services where and when they need them; 
and 
• That legislation ensures public safety. 
In April 1999 Bill 68, An Act in Memory of Brian Smith, to Amend the Mental Health Act 
and the Health Care Consent Act, was passed in the Ontario legislature. The legislation, 
named after Brian Smith, the Ottawa sports broadcaster killed in 1995 by a person 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, came into effect in December 2000. Hiltz and 
Szigeti (2004) note that the general thrust of the amendments was reflective of a policy 
shift from dangerousness criteria only to include commitment based on treatment needs 
as well (252). In addition to introducing community treatment order provisions, 
involuntary admission was expanded in two key ways. First, the "requirement of 
imminence" with respect to the "risk of harm" criteria was removed such that it was no 
31
 Newman, Dan. 1998. Mental Health: Beyond 2000: Strengthening Ontario's mental health system. A 
report on the consultative review of mental health reform in the province of Ontario. Accessed online April 
25, 2006. http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/mentalreform.html 
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 Newman, Dan. 1998. Mental Health: Beyond 2000: Strengthening Ontario's mental health system. A 
report on the consultative review of mental health reform in the province of Ontario. Accessed online April 
25, 2006. http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/mentalreform.html 
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longer necessary to prove that the patient had previously caused bodily harm to 
themselves or others (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 268). According to the government's fact 
sheet on Brian's Law, the word "imminent" was removed "in response to the 
recommendations of numerous coroner's inquests, health organizations, law enforcement 
agencies and family groups." The Ontario Medical Association, Ontario Psychiatric 
Association and the Schizophrenia Society of Ontario called for this change because the 
term caused "widespread confusion" and "prevented people who needed treatment from 
getting treatment and has jeopardized both the mentally ill and public safety."34 
Secondly, the commitment criteria were expanded to include the risk of mental and 
physical deterioration as a reason for involuntary admission.35 
The end result is that a physician now has five grounds for involuntary committal 
available: 
Mental Health: Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform), 2000, The Removal of "Imminent" 
from Brian's Law, Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Public Information, Publications. 
Accessed from the World Wide Web April 25,2006. 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/brianslaw.html. 
4
 Mental Health: Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform), 2000, The Removal of "Imminent" 
from Brian's Law, Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Public Information, Publications. 
Accessed from the World Wide Web April 25,2006. 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/brianslaw.html. 
5
 The new grounds of committal pursuant to Bill 68 apply to patients incapable of consenting to treatment 
as contained in s. 20(1.1): The attending physician shall complete a certificate of involuntary admission or 
a certificate of renewal if, after examining the patient, he or she is of the opinion that the patient: 
a) has previously received treatment for mental disorder of an ongoing or recurring nature that, when not 
treated, is of a nature or quality that likely will result in serious bodily harm to the person or to another 
person or substantial mental or physical deterioration of the person or serious physical impairment of the 
person; 
b) has shown clinical improvement as a result of the treatment; 
c) is suffering from the same mental disorder as the one for which he or she previously received treatment 
or from a mental disorder that is similar to the previous one; 
d) given the person's history of mental disorder and current mental or physical condition, is likely to cause 
serious bodily harm to himself or to another person or is likely to suffer mental or physical deterioration or 
serious physical impairment.; 
e) has been found incapable, within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, of consenting to his 
or her treatment in a psychiatric facility and the consent of his or her substitute decision-maker has been 
obtained; and 
f) if not suitable for admission or continuation as an informal or voluntary patient. 
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1. Risk of serious bodily harm to self; 
2. Risk of serious bodily harm to another person; 
3. Risk of serious physical impairment of self; 
4. Risk of substantial mental deterioration; and 
5. Risk of substantial physical deterioration (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 270) 
The first three criteria, which were present in the previous legislation, are now referred to 
as "Box A" criteria. The last two, where the person is deemed to be at risk of substantial 
mental or physical deterioration if not committed to a mental health care centre, were part 
of the Brian's Law amendments in 2000. The new grounds thus add "sickness" criteria to 
the former "dangerousness" criteria. Government policy documents state the purpose of 
these changes as such: 
The amendments add the ground of "substantial mental or physical deterioration" 
and focus on harms that could reasonably be expected to arise as a result of a lack 
of treatment in situations where the person has a history of serious mental 
disorder that has been successfully treated in the past. 
The patient need not form an imminent and probable danger, nor show signs of 
impending deterioration, the mere risk of harm stemming from treatment noncompliance 
is reason enough to compel treatment. Yet, at the same time as this legislation emerged, 
six of the nine provincial psychiatric hospitals were closed.37 CTOs, I argue, were thus a 
means of legitimizing the province's divestment in institutionalized mental health care 
while placating a public fearful of the untreated mental health patient. 
The introduction of the Mental Health Act's section on CTOs sets out their stated 
purpose, to provide "a person who suffers from a serious mental disorder with a 
Mental Health: Brian's Law (Mental Health Legislative Reform), 2000, New Committal Criteria, 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Public Information, Publications. Accessed from the 
World Wide Web April 25, 2006. http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/mental/brianslaw.html. 
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 Hansard, OLA, June 5, 2000. Accessed online April 25, 2006. http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/house-
proceedings/hansard_search.jsp?searchString=%22Brian%27s+law%22&go=Search&locale=en. 
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comprehensive plan of community-based treatment or care and supervision that is less 
restrictive than being detained in a psychiatric facility."38 The intention is to reduce or 
eliminate an individual's pattern of improving on medication while in hospital and 
following discharge deteriorating due to medication non-compliance (the so-called 
"revolving door syndrome")" (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 273). 
Hiltz and Szigeti have noted that community treatment orders (CTOs) combine the 
concepts of treatment and detention. The subject of the CTO is required to follow the 
treatment plan contained therein, under pain of detention. In the case of a CTO the 
"treatment" is the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 8)39. The 
CTP is a comprehensive plan that involves supervised treatment (in the form of 
medication) and the requirement to regularly attend appointments with a psychiatrist or 
other physician. It may also include other means of surveillance and restrictions on 
movement, including "participation in daily meetings with members of an assertive 
community treatment plan (ACT) or living in housing as specified in the CTP" (Hiltz and 
Szigeti, 2004, 8). 
I argue that CTOs are an example of the contradictory nature of neo-liberal regulation: 
legislation which gives the illusion of freedom while everywhere constraining that 
freedom. The Consent and Capacity Board has itself alluded to the (contradictory) 
intents of CTOs: 
JS
 Mental Health Act, 1990, R.S.O. c. M, s. 33.1(1). 
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 Substitute decision makers are named when a person is found incapable of consenting to treatment in 
accordance with the Health Care Consent Act, 1996. 
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The provisions of The Mental Health Act creating the scheme for 
community treatment orders are intended to be remedial in nature, not 
punitive, even though the legislation results in restraints upon the liberties 
of the people to whom it applies. Community treatment orders were 
created, according to paragraph 33.1(3), to get patients out of psychiatric 
facilities and into the community, to be supervised in a less restrictive 
fashion than in hospitals. Even though a community treatment order does 
restrain the liberty of a subject, the intent is to reduce restraints.40 
O'Reilly points out however that the reduced number of psychiatric beds available "has 
increasingly forced doctors to discharge hospitalized patients, even when many of these 
patients continue to meet committal criteria. There is, however, no such pressure to end 
the commitment of patients who are on an outpatient commitment order" (O'Reilly, 
2004, 583). O'Brien and Farrell, on the other hand, have found that CTOs are effective 
in "reducing hospitalization rates and lengths of readmission" (2005, 27). Their study, 
however, involved only 25 patients in one Ottawa area hospital. 
The CTO provides a strategy by which to compel the non-compliant mental health patient 
to be well. Community treatment orders "compel medication compliance in the 
community under pain of involuntary psychiatric admission" (Szigeti, 2001, 25-26). The 
CTO divests the state's traditional, welfarist duty of care for incapable psychiatric 
subjects who meet the terms of its conditions. Yet it creates new institutions and forms 
of regulation, which effectively expand the state's means of control, surveillance and 
supervision. This points to one of the contradictions inherent in neo-liberal ideology -
that state interference is not really reduced but is actually expanded. The effect is that the 
state's duty of care is replaced by the individual's duty to be well. 
C.I., Re (2002) CanLII 33965 (ON C.C.B. 
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Current definition of capacity to consent 
A person is presumed to be capable of consenting to treatment, which includes 
treatment under a CTO.41 The current definition of capacity to consent is the 
same in both the Health Care Consent Act and the Substitute Decisions Act: 
A person is capable with respect to treatment, admission to a care facility, 
personal assistance services or personal care if the person is able to 
understand the information that is relevant to making the decision and able 
to appreciate the reasonable foreseeable consequences of a decision or 
lack of decision.42 
This two-part capacity test is a codification of the principles for assessing capacity 
developed in the 1990 Weisstub Inquiry on Mental Competency (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 
149). In addition, the consideration of whether consent has been given is governed by s. 
11 of the Health Care Consent Act: 
11. (1) The following are the elements required for consent to treatment: 
1. The consent must relate to the treatment. 
2. The consent must be informed. 
3. The consent must be given voluntarily. 
4. The consent must not be obtained through misrepresentation or fraud. 
(2) A consent to treatment is informed if, before giving it, 
(a) the person received the information about the matters set out in 
subsection (3) that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would 
require in order to make a decision about the treatment; and 
(b) the person received responses to his or her requests for additional 
information about those matters. 
(3) The matters referred to in subsection (2) are: 
1. The nature of the treatment. 
2. The expected benefits of the treatment. 
3.The material risks of the treatment. 
4. The material side effects of the treatment. 
5. Alternative courses of action. 
6. The likely consequences of not having the treatment. 
41
 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sch. A., s. 4(2). 
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What gets taken into consideration at the level of the courts, is, as I will discuss in the 
following chapters, not a simple matter of applying the test for capacity in the legislation. 
As Chief Justice McLachlin stated in Starson v. Swayze (2003), questions of capacity to 
consent to treatment must balance out three societal values: autonomy, the right to 
receive effective treatment and security.43 
Conclusion 
The history of the laws regarding the capacity to consent to treatment in Ontario 
highlights conflicting principles of neo-liberalism: The principles of autonomy and self-
determination and the duty to be well are competing here. Where autonomy rights have 
been extended to psychiatric subjects in the name of expanding freedom of choice, 
restrictions have also been placed on that freedom such that freedoms may only be 
exercised in line with the duties of a responsible health consumer. Where neo-liberal 
doctrine calls for reduced state intervention, governance of the incapable psychiatric 
subject has actually multiplied. One strategy employed for expanding the control and 
surveillance of the psychiatric subject was the expansion of commitment criteria based on 
a series of potential "risks of harm." Another was to include treatment incapacity as a 
new commitment criteria. These changes are a response to public fears over security 
risks posed by the psychiatric subject. 
Throughout this chapter, I have shown that the history of capacity to consent law in 
Ontario is one of competing claims to authority between law and psychiatry. Psychiatric 
professionals have continually resisted attempts by legal authorities to constrain the 
43
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exercise of their powers. In the end, law adopts the discourse of psychiatry as a means of 
placating public fears through the adoption of CTO legislation. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches to Capacity to Consent 
There is no easy answer to the question of when a mentally ill person should be 
held incapable of making decisions concerning his or her medical treatment. 
Different societies have drawn different lines at different times. 
This statement by Chief Justice McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada in Starson v. 
Swayze points to the transient, socially and historically contingent nature of the concept 
of mental capacity. Where to "draw the line" strongly depends upon the ideological 
position to which one ascribes. The debate surrounding psychiatric patients' right to 
refuse treatment has traditionally been polarized between two positions: the 
"deontological rights position" held primarily by civil libertarians and the 
"consequentialist position" held primarily by the psychiatric community (Goodwin, 1997, 
265). 
The deontological position asserts that imposing treatment against a patient's will goes 
counter to their civil rights. Proponents of this view suggest that these individuals have 
the right to be left to make autonomous, independent choices concerning their bodies. 
They also argue that social policies which aim to restore patient autonomy while 
minimizing risks through compulsory community treatment are necessarily at odds 
(Goodwin, 1997,265). 
The psychiatric literature, in contrast, adheres to the consequentialist position and 
suggests physicians have a duty to treat and that patients have a right to be treated. The 
"right to treatment" argument arose in opposition to the autonomy rights arguments of the 
44
 Starson v. Swayze [2003] 304 N.R. 326 (SCC), par. 8, my emphasis. 
48 
1970s. According to this theory, "the 'seriously and persistently mentally ill' should, by 
chemical management of their symptoms, recover their reason and conduct themselves 
accordingly within society; responsibility confers rights" (Fabris, 2006, 46-47, my 
emphasis). Treatment decisions are arguably made in the best interests of the patient. 
Failure to treat, through the administration of psychotropic medication, is seen as 
imposing a risk of harm to both patients and public. Consequentialists argue that risk 
management, by way of compulsory treatment, where the case permits, is a justifiable 
restriction to patient autonomy (Goodwin, 1997, 265). 
A third approach, therapeutic justice, examines questions in terms of whether or not a 
proposed therapy is beneficial. The approach is most notably used in cases involving 
substance abusers and the mentally ill in courts of special jurisdiction, such as Drug 
Courts and Mental Health Courts45 (Slovenko, 2004). Bruce Winick, a key therapeutic 
justice theorist, notes: 
It examines the principles of cognitive and social psychology and psychodynamic 
theory in order to speculate about the likely impact of recognizing that patients 
and offenders have a right to refuse treatment, and a corresponding opportunity to 
choose such treatment (Winick, 1994, 100). 
The assumption here is that getting a patient to "voluntarily" choose treatment is 
beneficial, not only because of the treatment itself, but due to the psychological benefits 
derived simply from exercising "choice" as opposed to being forced to do something. 
" CNW Telbec. February 12, 2007. Mental Health Court opens in Ottawa offering hope and better 
outcomes for those with mental illness. Accessed September 26, 2007. 
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/February2007/12/c7207.html 
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The present thesis breaks with these approaches, all of which are based on traditional 
liberal principles, by examining capacity to consent law through a genealogical approach 
- one that examines the conditions that make possible particular strategies vis-a-vis the 
concept of capacity to consent. 
Foucault challenged liberalism's tendency to take dichotomous positions on power as 
either legitimate or illegitimate. This "juridico-discursive" understanding of power, 
particularly as applied in law, functions as a means to "delineate the conditions under 
which the application of state coercion can be justified" (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 16). 
Court justices incorporate this liberal doctrine in deciding upon the limitations to 
subjects' rights to self-determination. The problem with focusing on these dichotomous 
questions of power, Foucault argues, is that it "deflects attention away from the 
techniques and tactics of power" (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 16). My analysis of these 
legal decisions examines where and how limitations are placed - how administrative 
tribunals and courts take into consideration psychiatric testimony and come to decisions 
as to a patient's capacity or incapacity. However, my goal is not to pronounce as to the 
legitimacy of these decisions but rather to view these decisions as evidence of broader 
political strategies and techniques of producing entrepreneurial neo-liberal subjects. 
In this chapter I discuss the theoretical concepts most compelling for the analysis of these 
texts. This discussion begins with Foucault's work on power, knowledge and subjectivity 
as well as technologies of the self as these concepts are fundamental to an understanding 
of how the incapacitated psychiatric subject is produced and regulated. I situate the 
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analysis within our contemporary form of socio-political rule, neo-liberalism. The move 
to neo-liberalism over the past three decades has produced the neo-liberal subject (Isin, 
2004, 217); an entrepreneurial subject responsible for their own welfare. Neo-liberal 
governance strategies accordingly operate on presumptions of autonomy and self-
discipline. This is essential to understanding how capacity to consent law, including the 
emergence of community treatment orders, problematizes and responds to treatment non-
compliance. 
I also discuss the governmentality approach to risk and its appropriateness to the study of 
capacity to consent. I argue that treatment non-compliance is constituted as a "risk 
object" and contemporary capacity to consent laws are strategies aimed at regulating that 
risk. A number of contradictions inherent in neo-liberal ideology become apparent. As 
risks become generalized and discursively multiply, greater interventions of surveillance 
and control are employed, thus contradicting the doctrine of reduced state intervention. 
Furthermore, while neo-liberalism assumes a free and autonomous subject, governance 
strategies constrain self-determination and the choices one is "free" to make. 
Power and the Psychiatric Subject 
Power, in the Foucauldian sense, operates on the local, everyday level. As Turner points 
out, "[p]ower is embodied in the day-to-day practices of the medical profession within 
the clinic, through the activities of social workers, through the mundane decision-making 
of legal officers ..." (1997, xii). These are typical examples of the way power is 
exercised in the day-to-day lives of persons who are subject to determinations of capacity 
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to consent to psychiatric treatment. Relations of power/knowledge are at work within the 
context of the psychiatric assessment, the social workers involved in the individual's 
community treatment plan team, and the decision-making processes of police officers, 
Consent and Capacity Board members and Court justices. 
Power can be exercised to produce knowledge about subjects and knowledge in turn is 
implemented in the exercise of power. Power and knowledge are thus inextricably 
intertwined. Foucault notes, "there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault, 1984, 175). This concept of 
power is not negative and coercive but rather it is productive in that it produces a 
particular type of subject. The exercise of power is "a way in which certain actions 
modify others" or "an action upon an action" (Foucault, 1982, 219-220). This form of 
power operates through techniques of persuasion aimed at modifying practices (Foucault, 
1991). 
In contrast, acts directly aimed at a body are acts of violence, not acts of power, whereas 
those aimed at the soul or the psyche work in a positive sense to produce certain actions 
(Foucault, 1984, 173; 176). There are, however, instances where acts of violence 
continue to be used. An example lies in the forced medication of psychiatric subjects 
deemed incapable of consenting to treatment. In some instances, this results in both the 
physical and chemical restraint of the subject. 
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Power only exists when it is exercised; it is therefore not possessed or exchanged. The 
possibility of resistance is always present since "power is only effective if the subjects of 
power are able to react in a range of ways" (Nettleton, 1997, 217). This implies that 
subjects must be free to act. This poses a quandary, however, in the present study since 
the psychiatric subject's freedom to act is constrained both by the symptoms of their 
condition and by the legal restrictions placed upon their freedom. 
The analysis of power relations lies in the examination of the resistance to forms or 
techniques of exercising power. This may include, for example, struggles against 
techniques of social domination or exploitation (Foucault, 1982, 211-212). It may also 
include resistance to various forms of knowledge and claims to "truth," such as those 
proclaimed by medical or psychological experts. In the cases before us, I examine the 
incapacitated subjects' resistance to their status and truth claims regarding their 
condition. 
The Psychiatric Subject as a Product of Power/Knowledge 
Foucault46 argues there are three modes of human obj edification. These modes function 
to turn human beings into subjects of knowledge. The first refers to methods used in the 
In Madness and Civilization (1965), Foucault traced the genealogy of the point where madness was 
constituted as a mental illness. The point was argued to lie at the end of the eighteenth century when the 
language of psychiatry ended any further debate as to what madness was - "it was mental illness" (x). The 
publication of this treatise coincided with the emergence of the anti-psychiatry movement of the mid 1960s 
(Turner, 1997, x). Key players in this movement, namely Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing, went so far as to 
claim that "mental illness did not exist, and that the treatment being used for mental illness were simply 
chemical straitjackets" (Healy, 2004, 219). While these claims may fall at the extreme end of a critical 
continuum, they form part of the critique of disease categories as forms of social normalization. This 
critical approach to the understanding of mental illness was part of the shift from medical sociology to the 
sociology of health and illness, a movement informed by Foucault's theoretical and philosophical analysis 
(Turner 1997). 
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pursuit of scientific inquiry whereby subjects are objectified, for example those used on 
prisoners or patients. The second consists of "dividing practices;" ways in which subjects 
are characterized as, for example, healthy or sick, sane or insane. Lastly, humans are 
subjectified when they engage in turning themselves into subjects (Foucault, 1982, 208; 
Rabinow, 1984, 8-10). 
Since the subject is an object of knowledge, and the scientific realm of knowledge within 
which the modern subject has arisen is concerned primarily with a search for the "truth," 
the modern subject is tied to an obligation of truth. This truth obligation is at once an 
obligation to know the truth about oneself and to confess that truth to others (Foucault, 
1997). While the process of subjedification involves measures taken by people to create 
themselves and to know themselves as particular types of selves, these measures are 
mediated by authority figures. In this case, the authority figures are experts who uphold 
various forms of knowledge as the "truth." 
The contemporary form of scientific inquiry governing the incapacitated psychiatric 
patient is psychiatry, and the related discipline of psychology as well as social work. The 
birth of psychiatry and psychology as scientific disciplines made it possible to develop 
knowledge in keeping with a particular brand of truth, and the practitioners of this new 
discipline claim authority to this truth (Rose, 1998, 22). 
Within the field of medicine, and psychiatry more specifically, the disease model of 
illness is the current medical framework by which psychiatric conditions are understood. 
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Medical frameworks are ideologies that uphold certain ways of knowing about conditions 
while subverting other explanatory models (Eaton, 2001, 9). The introduction of 
psychoactive drugs represents the genesis of a new medical model while signalling the 
end of the age of psychoanalysis, mainly the Freudian psychoanalytic approach 
(Cockerham, 24). Bassman has observed that since the dominant position on mental 
illness is the "brain-disease model," only chemical solutions are proposed to improve 
subjects' lives (Bassman, 2005, 490). Since the dominant position is upheld as the 
"truth," alternative solutions are problematized. 
Dividing practices are methods by which "the subject is objectified by a process of 
division either within himself or from others" (Foucault, 1982, 208). These practices are 
therefore closely linked to the scientific (or pseudo-scientific) modes of inquiry by which 
those subjects are understood, classified, and worked upon (Rabinow, 1984, 8). In the 
context of my analysis, they are practices, informed by dominant legal and psychiatric 
discourses, by which the subject is declared capable or incapable of consenting to 
treatment. 
Acts of subjectification are ways in which people engage in "self-formation" (Rabinow, 
1984, 11). Practices of subjectification therefore require that a person be free to act. 
Rose defines subjectification as "processes and practices by means of which human 
beings come to relate to themselves and others as subjects of a certain type" (1998, 25). 
In other words, they are methods by which we come to know ourselves. We may know 
ourselves as confident, unstable, determined, stressed, or belonging to any variety of 
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categories. As we will see from the cases being analyzed, it is hoped that through 
treatment compliance, by force if necessary, incapable psychiatric subjects will improve 
their conditions to the point at which they may gain insight into themselves and, thus, be 
able to achieve the ability to form self-knowledge. That self-knowledge, however, must 
correspond to certain dominantly held scientific "truths." As Foucault argued, the "main 
point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences 
as very specific "truth games" related to specific techniques that human beings use to 
understand themselves" (1997, 224). Through the present thesis I hope to challenge 
certain "truth games" related to the techniques imposed upon psychiatric subjects. 
Technologies Governing Psychiatric Subjects 
Two other concepts instrumental to the analysis of capacity to consent case law are 
"technologies of the self and "technologies of power." Both, I argue, are employed in 
the legal governance of the incapable psychiatric subject. Technologies of the self are 
"technologies which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of 
others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (Foucault, 1997, 225). 
These practices are forms of self-discipline but should not be considered entirely self-
directed but rather as techniques informed by experts of the "psy sciences" (Rose, 
1999a). Rose notes that this shift from discipline to self-discipline occurred alongside the 
emergence of the psychological professions (Rose, 1999a). These professions therefore 
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played a vital role in defining both the concept of the self-disciplining neo-liberal subject 
and the practices people were to employ in order to emerge as a self-disciplined subject. 
Technologies of power are those "which determine the conduct of individuals and submit 
them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject" (Foucault, 1997, 
225). Compelling mental health patients to comply to treatment requires both of these 
forms - technologies of power to impose treatment, and technologies of the self to bring 
about a state of self-compliance with treatment and the duty to be well. Self-mastery is, 
however, a prerequisite for obtaining a satisfactory level of mental health. If the patient 
cannot show that she is capable of mastering her impulses and eliminating her delusions, 
then she will continue to be ordered to work upon improving her mental health through 
enforced treatment compliance. 
Greco explains this failure of self-mastery as a failure of self-care: "If the regulation of 
life-style, the modification of risky behaviour and the transformation of unhealthy 
attitudes prove impossible through sheer strength of will, this constitutes, at least in part, 
a failure of the self to take care of itself- a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of 
skillfulness [...]" (Greco, 1993, 361). Self-care is a prerequisite to being an active, 
productive citizen in a neo-liberal society. One must master self-care by means of self-
discipline or one will be forced to do so. 
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The Affinity of Neo-liberalism and Legal Governance of Psychiatric Subjects: 
I argue that the legal governance of psychiatric subjects has changed from the state's duty 
of care to the patient's duty to be well. This change, I argue, has emerged alongside the 
move from liberal to neo-liberal rationalities. Our contemporary form of governance "is 
characterized by an approach to political rule, neo-liberalism, which champions 
individual freedom and rights against the excessive intervention of the state" (Lupton, 
1999, 86). It also calls upon citizens to make their own choices and provide for their own 
welfare (Lupton, 1999, 25). 
According to neo-liberal theory individual freedoms are guaranteed through "strong 
individual property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning 
markets and free trade" (Harvey, 2005, 64). While the state preserves the freedom of the 
marketplace, individuals are called upon to be accountable for their own well-being 
through responsible actions. Success or failure, whether in terms of finance, education, 
health, or other aspects of one's life, is attributed to the individual's entrepreneurial 
strengths and weaknesses (Harvey, 2005, 64-65). Strategies aimed at governing the 
subject of freedom are contingent upon the wider economic and political perspective, one 
that argues for the removal of barriers to the freedom of choice (Rose, 1999b, 84). As a 
mode of discourse it has become so pervasive as to become "the common-sense way 
many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world" (Harvey, 2005, 3). 
Neo-liberal rationalities emphasize "the entrepreneurial individual, endowed with 
freedom and autonomy, and the capacity to care for him- or herself (Rose, 1993, 288 in 
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Petersen, 1997, 194). Individuals are attributed "social destinies" according to their 
capacity for both self-care and risk avoidance (Petersen, 1999, 193-194). The social 
destiny attributed to psychiatric patients who fail at self-care and risk avoidance is that of 
being labelled incapable of consenting to the treatment proposed by the psychiatric 
experts. After all, "freedom must be practiced ethically" (Foucault, 1997, 284) and, if the 
patient is unable to do so, certain restrictions will be imposed on their autonomy. 
The principle of "responsibilization" is an important feature of neo-liberal doctrine 
(Dean, 1999, 166). And a neo-liberal health system is one that produces responsible 
health entrepreneurs (Osborne, 1997; Rose, 2000). Psychiatric patients, I argue, are no 
exception to the entrepreneurial rule - only for them, responsibilization means adherence 
to the "psy expert's" chosen course of treatment. The patient is thus responsible for 
adhering to a "duty to be well" - the duty to reduce the risks associated with treatment 
non-compliance. 
The Role of "Risk" Discourses in Neo-Liberal Governance 
How do deregulated and divested institutions, such as the deinstitutionalized mental 
health services, operate as sites of power/knowledge production in the context of a neo-
liberal society? How do they produce responsible mental health entrepreneurs? Turner 
argues that our current uncertainties at the level of the global political economy and the 
associated global risks have created a desire for greater surveillance and discipline within 
our internal social structures. "[A] risk society, based on deregulation and devolution, 
often requires more subtle and systematic forms of control" (Turner, 1997, xviii). In the 
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area of health and medicine, an increased focus on generalized risk results in greater 
emphasis on surveillance and prevention, such that risks come to be worked on as 
diseases in and of themselves - to be eliminated (Lupton, 1995; Turner, 1997). 
Therefore, where a psychiatric subject is argued to pose a risk of harm to themselves or 
others without proper medication, whether or not there is any substantiated evidence of 
harm inflicted, restrictions are imposed on their autonomy in an effort to avoid potential 
harm. But as risks are discursively generalized and expanded so too are the strategies 
employed to counter those risks. 
Approaches to Risk 
Theoretical approaches to risk fall into two broad camps: the psychometric perspective 
and the social constructionist perspective. Psychometric approaches to risk are based on 
a theory of rational behaviour by rational risk-adverse agents (Lupton, 1999, 21). This 
perspective holds that risks are understood as objective facts whereby expert knowledges 
hold the "truth" concerning the probabilistic nature of risk occurrence. Individuals are 
then judged on their ability to self-regulate their behaviour in accordance with these 
expert accounts (Lupton, 1999, 18-19). In contrast, social constructionist perspectives 
examine the way risks are understood and constituted within the broader social and 
cultural setting (Lupton, 1999, 18, 25). 
An underlying assumption informing this thesis is that the concept of mental incapacity 
and the risks associated with it are socially constructed. Taking a social constructionist 
position means that what is considered a "risk" changes based on the norms, morals and 
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beliefs at work in a given society at a given time (Lupton, 1999, 29). Furthermore, risks 
are constituted by the discourses and knowledge systems surrounding them. Therefore, 
the risks associated with mental illness, whether it be how subjects are defined as being at 
risk of harm to self or others, or the risks and benefits of psychopharmaceutical 
treatments, are all discursively constituted. 
Risk discourses are technologies of governance that operate through the exercise of 
power and knowledge. In keeping with Foucault's analysis of bio-power, technologies of 
risk are both individualizing and totalizing; they work on the conduct of individual lives 
as well as the whole of the social body (Petersen, 1997, 194). The risk discourse goes 
beyond mere dichotomies of healthy or unhealthy, sane or insane, to include a whole 
range of behaviours deemed to be potentially "at risk" (Petersen, 1997, 195). 
Furthermore, strategies aimed at preventing risks have regulatory effects upon those 
individuals deemed to be "at risk" (Petersen 1997, 193). In this case, psychiatric patients 
found incapable of consenting to treatment have their treatment, living conditions and 
daily routines regulated as a means of countering the risks associated with their illness. 
The word "risk" is associated with a wide range of phenomena in contemporary society. 
But how do issues get framed as "risky?" To be deemed risky, Lupton argues, behaviours 
and substances must first become constructed as "risk objects." This has the effect of 
identifying those objects as the source of harm (Lupton, 1999, 30-31). In our neo-liberal 
environment, risks are understood as calculable events to be managed by rational social 
actors. Risk is therefore associated with individual choice and autonomy, with blame 
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being placed on those who make risky choices. In Ontario's consent and capacity case 
law, treatment non-compliance is, I argue, clearly identified as a risk object. As the 
consent and capacity judgments indicate, treatment non-compliance is associated with a 
variety of risks, such as the risk of deterioration of mental condition and a neglect of self-
care. These two situations are, in turn, argued to lead to behaviour dangerous to the 
individual and to the public. 
The approach I take to risk discourse is based on the governmentality approach inspired 
by Michel Foucault. 
Taking a governmentality approach to risk means exploring how the concept of 
risk is produced in a society where the population is surveilled and regulated in a 
subtle and insidious manner; where citizens engage in their own surveillance and 
regulation. Concepts of risk that arise in this environment arguably produce 
particularly normalized behaviour, which citizens are expected to adhere to 
(Lupton, 1999,25). 
The governmentality approach to risk stems from Foucault's 1978 lecture of the same 
name wherein he explained the necessity of studying technologies of power in concert 
with an analysis of their corresponding political rationalities (Lemke, 2000: 1). Here 
Foucault shows that, beginning with the population expansion in the eighteenth century, 
the affairs of government turned to the problems of the population as a whole. From this 
point on, government concerns extend beyond the mere "act of government" to include 
goals of health, welfare, and prosperity (1991, 100). The power exercised by government 
becomes positive, in the sense that the goal is overall improvement and productivity. 
These ends can be achieved both by direct and indirect means, through strategies which 
persuade members of the population to engage in practices which lead to desirable ends 
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(ibid). This thesis examines the strategies used to persuade psychiatric subjects, the 
practices to which they are persuaded to adhere and the ultimate goals of those practices 
as detailed in the capacity to consent case law. 
To govern, Foucault argues, "is to structure the possible field of action of others" (1982, 
221). Governance therefore presupposes freely acting subjects: "subjects who are free in 
the primary sense of living and thinking beings endowed with bodily and mental 
capacities (cf Patton, 1998)" (Dean, 1999, 13). This has important implications for the 
study of the governance of psychiatric subjects, particularly where the status of their 
mental capacity is the object of a legal challenge. But as Dean acknowledges, even 
where freedoms are removed, such as being imprisoned, the subject "is urged to take 
responsibility for her own state, and the pain she is causing herself, and to take such 
action as will remove that pain" (1999, 15). Similarly, I argue that the involuntary 
psychiatric patient, or the subject of a community treatment order, is encouraged to act 
responsibly by agreeing to and adhering to a treatment plan. 
According to Dean, government works both through practices of freedom and practices 
of domination (1999, 34). To govern is to recognize the subject's capacity for action. In 
situations where tactics of "coercion, constraint, domination and oppression" still operate, 
freedoms are constrained. Justifications for those constraints are often given on the basis 
of upholding the freedom of others. Rose notes that this argument of the constraint of the 
few for the freedom of many is then made to justify coercion with the aim of reforming 
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"pathological individuals so that they are willing and able to accept the rights and 
responsibilities of freedom" (Rose, 1999b, 10). 
"Governing Through Freedom" 
As previously discussed, our present technologies of government are geared towards 
governing through freedom, however, a paradox arises here: the "opposition between 
freedom and government:" 
Freedom is understood in terms of the act of liberation from bondage or 
slavery, the condition of existence in liberty, the right of the individual to 
act in any desired way without restraint, the power to do as one likes. The 
politics of our present, to the extent that it is defined and delimited by the 
values of liberalism, is structured by the opposition between freedom and 
government. (Rose, 1999b, 62) 
To the extent that a subject is governed, then, freedom is constrained. Rose argues there 
is a particular type of freedom that has an affinity with the current means of political rule 
(1999b, 63). Our current idea of freedom is one infused with the notion of an 
autonomous individual exercising free choice. That freedom of choice must, however, be 
exercised responsibly; this is a condition placed on freedom. "Individuals, that is to say, 
must come to recognize and act upon themselves as both free and responsible, both 
beings of liberty and members of society, if liberal government is to be possible" (Rose, 
1999b, 68). Of course, a mode of government which endows the subject with the 
requirement to choose responsibly, also gives them the right to refuse responsible choices 
(ibid.). And that is the case of psychiatric patients refusing treatment and challenging 
their status as "incapable" of making a (responsible) choice. 
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Various strategies are employed with the aim of persuading "at risk" subjects to exercise 
their freedom responsibly. Rose gives as an example the new risk-management strategies 
which have come to "shape the provision of mental health services across the English-
speaking world in the late 1990s" (1999b, 4). I argue that changes brought about to 
Ontario's capacity to consent laws in the same time period are also a response to the risk-
management discourse directly aligned with neo-liberal ideology. 
Harvey also argues that while "individuals are supposedly free to choose" (2005, 69), 
those choices are greatly limited to choices which are aligned with the goals and 
strategies of neo-liberalism. Furthermore, certain individuals remain excluded from the 
neo-liberal regime of choice - by virtue of their lack of freedom. These individuals are 
the "usual suspects" - single parents, juvenile delinquents, substance abusers, and the 
homeless. Most importantly for our purposes, these individuals also include former 
involuntary psychiatric patients (Rose, 1999b, 88-89). Neo-liberal governance also 
"creates the paradox of intense state interventions and government by elites and 'experts' 
in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist" (Harvey, 2005, 69). 
Surveillance and policing are multiplied in an endeavour to restore order and ensure 
security in a state dealing with the fallout of increasing marginalized populations 
(Harvey, 2005, 77). Deinstitutionalization has arguably increased the population of the 
mentally ill, a marginalized population, on the streets. Strategies aimed at restoring order 
and security include enacting new legislation such as the Safe Streets Act, which 
effectively criminalizes homelessness and panhandling, and Brian's Law, which 
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mandates the conditions whereby deinstitutionalized mental health patients would not be 
returned to the community unless their condition is chemically controlled. 
From Dangerousness to (Risk of) Dangerousness 
According to Rose, the move from thinking in terms of pathologizing subjects to 
constructing individuals as "at risk" creates an extended role for "psy" experts. It is now 
necessary to observe, note and assess factors that can be used to "predict future 
pathology." In the governance of risk, not only do these experts claim to be able to 
predict future behaviour but they are increasingly obliged to make probability 
calculations, based on a combination of risk factors, that accurately assess an individual's 
propensity to pathological behaviour (Castel, 1991, 281; Rose, 1998, 94-95). 
The result of this move is that indications of dangerousness no longer have to be 
personally observed. "It is enough that she or he is identified as a member of a 'risky 
population' based on a 'risk profile' developed from calculations using demographic and 
other characteristics" (Lupton, 1999, 93). This is further based in the belief that the 
actions of individuals are highly predictable (Lupton, 1999, 94-95). 
The problem with both the "dangerousness" and "risk of dangerousness" theories 
promoted in the psychiatric field is that, either way, mental illness becomes conflated 
with dangerousness. This problem is further aggravated when one considers that the 
"diagnosis of mental illness lacks reliability, and psychiatry is generally unable to predict 
dangerousness with any great precision" (McCallum, 1997, 46). It has also been noted 
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that changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) further attempt to conflate 
dangerousness and mental illness - "the official definitions of pathology used by 
psychiatry, as contained in the various versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), have increasingly, with each new revision, incorporated 
language about 'violence'" (Dellaire, 2000, 683). The end result is that a set of 
tautological criteria is applied - "need for help, need for treatment, lack of compliance, 
lack of insight, inability to take care of oneself' (Dellaire, 2000, 691-692). This can lead 
to legal intervention (the need to control) to impose psychiatric "help" (the need to treat) 
- an intersecting of legal and psychiatric discourses. 
The "Normative" Power of Law: The Intersection of Legal and Psychiatric 
Discourses 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, legal practitioners turned to the disciplines of 
medicine, psychiatry and social sciences to aid in their deliberations. Foucault refers to 
this as the "normalization" of the law (Rabinow, 1994, 21). Given that the twentieth 
century has been referred to as the "Age of Psychiatry," questions of human behaviour 
have been spoken about in the language of psychiatry. Since the law also makes 
pronouncements on human behaviour, it too refers to the language and principles of 
psychiatry. Law, in turn, also regulates psychiatric practices: questions of 
institutionalization, right to treatment, and right to refuse treatment amongst them 
(Slovenko, 2004). Questions of capacity to consent to treatment, including the capacity 
to consent to treatment orders, necessarily involve the intersected discourses of law and 
psychiatry. 
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In contrast to the popular notion of the legitimacy and neutrality of law, Carol Smart 
argues that "law exercises power" and that the exercise of that power needs to be 
challenged (Smart, 1989, 4). Foucault observes that some discourses, such as expert 
discourses pertaining to law or medicine or psychiatry, make claims to truth that become 
legitimated by a society which holds expert knowledges as the ultimate truth. According 
to Smart, law sets itself at the top of this hierarchy, even above other forms of expert 
knowledge, while at the same time disqualifying competing forms of knowledge (1989, 
10-11). The "truth" upheld by law should therefore be investigated rather than taken for 
granted (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 12). Law "also involves a distinctive production of 
truth. Not only do procedures of law (trial, cross-examination, etc.) provide authorized 
means by which the truth is discovered, but once enunciated law provides the guarantee 
of this truth" (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 41). 
Judgments determining what is in a person's "best interests" may therefore sound 
objective when expressed in authoritative terms by courts of law. The belief that law is 
neutral and relies on scientifically determined objective facts contributes to its power and 
legitimacy. However, more commonly, these judgments are not made pursuant to any 
objective study of what would be socially acceptable in a particular context. Rather, they 
reflect the moral attitudes of court justices (Smart, 1989). Reference is frequently made 
in the capacity to consent case law to forced medication as being "in the patient's best 
interest." However, the patient's "best interests" are not supposed to be considered in 
capacity to consent hearings as an "objective" test for capacity is supposed to be the 
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determining factor. The language of "best interests," does, however, continue to surface 
in these proceedings. 
Freedom and the Intersection of Law and Psychiatry 
Our current political landscape is highly concerned with questions of freedom: "over 
what it is, what it should be, what purports to be freedom whilst being its opposite" 
(Rose, 1999b, 94). These debates figure prominently within the concerns of moral 
philosophy and questions regarding limitations of government interventions (ibid.). An 
example of this is debates over capacity to consent: when and where do "best interests" 
and public security trump freedom to choose, or refuse, psychiatric treatment? 
Presumptions of capacity for self-governance also inform moral and ethical discussions 
and policy debates. Debates arise surrounding the point at which freedom of agency 
must give way to (imposed) human well-being and which public policies are an 
appropriate response to these questions (Tobias, 2005, 82). Dean gives as an example 
policies enacted to ensure people receiving social benefits are required to attend meetings 
and counselling sessions (Dean, 1999). Likewise, subjects of community treatment 
orders are obliged, as part of the prescribed treatment plan, to attend appointments with 
psychiatric professionals, receive treatment under monitored conditions, attend 
counselling sessions, group meetings and live in specified residences under pain of 
enforced commitment. Failure to meet these conditions means failing to meet the 
obligations of a self-disciplined citizen. 
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Tobias' approach suggests that a certain degree of human functioning is a prerequisite to 
both personal freedom and self-creation and that these boundaries are culturally and 
historically determined (Tobias, 2005). It is of no use to grant the patient autonomy 
where they are lacking the capacity for freedom. Freedom, according to Foucault, can 
also mean being free from impulses and delusions: "being free means not being a slave to 
oneself and one's appetites" (Foucault, 1997, 286). 
This concept of freedom brings to mind the work of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim 
concluded that what is moral is that which makes man [sic] "regulate his actions by 
something other than the promptings of his own egoism" (1984, 331). Those who are 
unable to self-regulate their actions or are unconscious of their actions will lose freedom 
since freedom is only truly achieved where one is able to control their desires through 
discipline (1985, 177). An autonomous individual is one who has managed to internalize 
a society's rules of moral contact; not by blindly conforming to those rules but by having 
the intellectual capacity to rationally do so (Durkheim, 1985, 179). 
In this chapter I have discussed the traditional theoretical approaches to capacity to 
consent and how a genealogical approach responds to the short-comings of dichotomous 
questions of legitimate and illegitimate power. A genealogical approach to a topic, in this 
case, capacity to consent, considers the "conditions of possibility" which give rise to a 
particular phenomenon, or, as Hunt and Wickham define it, "what combination of 
circumstances in dispersed and seemingly unconnected fields of social activity combines 
in such a way to give rise to some outcome" (1994, 6). Adopting this approach to the 
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present study of capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment allows us to view the use of 
capacity to consent law as a form of legal governance of psychiatric subjects. In doing 
so, we can explore how mental capacity, as a legal and psychiatric concept, has 
developed alongside a particular route of social economy: the emergence of neo-
liberalism. 
I have discussed the "conditions of possibility" aligned with the emergence of neo-liberal 
doctrine according to governmentality theorists: political divestment, 
deinstitutionalization, assumptions of self-regulating entrepreneurial subjects based on 
theories of the "psy sciences," and the proliferation of "risk" discourses. These strategies 
of governance all have produced regulatory effects and those effects are felt throughout 
society - this thesis examines one microcosm of those effects - the governance of 
psychiatric subjects. 
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Chapter Three: Method Principles for the 
Sociology of Capacity to Consent Law as Governance 
In order to study how the concept of the incapacity to consent to psychiatric treatment is 
treated in Ontario, I conduct a discourse analysis of the texts (the written legal decisions, 
or case law) on capacity to consent. Specifically, I follow the "method principles for the 
sociology of law as governance" developed by Hunt and Wickham (1994). This 
genealogical account of ways in which law serves to govern the conduct of subjects is a 
form of Foucauldian discourse analysis. This chapter on method principles will serve to 
define discourse analysis, the genealogical approach, the principles of the sociology of 
law as governance and why this approach is appropriate for the present study. I will then 
explain how I gathered the sample of case law to be analyzed and the questions I will 
pose in relation to those texts. 
The analysis of discourse: 
Discourse may be defined as : 
[A] group of statements which provide a language for talking about - a way of 
representing knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical 
moment [...]. Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. 
But [...] since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and 
influence what we do - our conduct - all practices have a discursive aspect (Hall, 
1992, 291, in Hall, 1997,44). 
Discourse is therefore not only spoken or written language, it also encompasses actions, 
ways of doing things, or practices. Discourse combines what is said (language) with 
what is done (practice) within a historical context. This could mean, for example, the 
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practices of restraining a psychiatric patient, confining them to a solitary space, or means 
of governing their behaviour in the community. 
Discourses are productive - they define and produce our objects of knowledge as well as 
our ways of doing things. They govern the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about 
and reasoned. They also influence how those meanings are put into practice and used to 
regulate the conduct of others (Hall, 1997, 44). 
Just as a discourse defines the possible ways a topic may be spoken about and acted 
upon, so too does it delineate ways a topic may not be understood or talked about (Hall, 
1997, 44). The ways a topic comes to be spoken about and acted upon becomes the 
dominant, or "common sense" discourse on that topic (McKee, 2003, 100). Other ways 
of defining, thinking about, or acting upon a concept, are, by contrast, subverted and 
marginalized. 
A focus on the language used in legal decisions allows us to investigate law as a site of 
production of knowledge. An analysis of language allows us to view how power and 
knowledge come together to pronounce the "truth" about a subject. As Feldman has 
stated, language is at once a technique of and effect of power. Language produces and 
re-produces both meaning and social reality (Feldman, 1998, 258). Therefore, focusing 
on the language used by the courts in written decisions is one way of finding evidence for 
how an issue is understood and what that means for subjects involved. Language is also 
"an instrument for producing new forms of thought about persons, and new ways of 
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calculating those very areas of human affairs which need to be managed and governed" 
(McCallum, 1997, 57). Language is therefore an "intellectual technology" ... a 
technology aimed at the production of knowledge that categorizes subjects in order that 
certain populations may be managed and governed (Miller and Rose 1988, 1990 in 
McCallun, 1997, 57). Given this, analyzing the discourse of capacity to consent to 
psychiatric treatment is a method by which to view how psychiatric patients come to 
become understood as "incapable" and how the conduct of the incapable subject is then 
governed. It has been well documented that language surrounding determinations of 
"incompetency" and/or "incapacity" "conveys many linguistic nuances" (Silberfield, 
1990, 37) and that, furthermore, the use of this language conveys statements concerning 
the subject's "social worth" (Alexander and Lewin, 1972, 18-20 in Carney, 1997, 1). 
This focus on discourse as a sociological method is part of the "linguistic turn" in social 
theory. The linguistic turn, as it applies to mental illness, is part of a project that 
"attempts to place 'mental illness' within the realms of history, culture, and politics..." 
(Fee, 2000, 2). From this perspective, mental illness, and concepts associated with it, 
such as mental incapacity, are not argued to be "problems," but "problems of knowledge" 
(Fee, 2000, 2). According to Purvis and Hunt, "[discourse theory is one of the major 
consequences of the linguistic turn, that marks a break from action theory and focuses on 
the centrality of the 'linguistic constitution' of the social" (1993, 480). The subject is no 
longer viewed as constituted through ideology but as produced through discourse. The 
subject is no longer seen as an independent creator of meaning. The contention of 
modern theory and of the Enlightenment project that individuals are autonomous, free-
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willed, rational beings is replaced by the idea that subjects are produced through 
discourse, power, and knowledge. 
The genealogical approach: 
The central theoretical concepts behind a genealogical account are discourse, power, and 
knowledge (Carabine, 2001, 267). This "means that we read discourses as, on the one 
hand, being infused with power/knowledge and, on the other, as playing a role in 
producing power/knowledge networks" (Carabine, 2001, 268). So, when we "read" 
discourses we examine them with an understanding that the object under investigation is 
replete with relations of power/knowledge. Dominant discourses will define what is 
understood as the "truth" at a particular historical moment, but "counter-discourses" are 
also present - those subverted discourses that resist and pose a challenge to the dominant 
discourse (ibid.). Therefore, the account I offer of capacity to consent to psychiatric 
treatment examines the dominant discourse as well as the challenges made to that 
discourse. 
A genealogical approach rejects the traditional social science preoccupation with cause 
and effect because these methods of research are based on particular assumptions about 
human subjects; specifically about human intentionality and rationality (Hunt and 
Wickham, 1994, 6). Instead, Foucault's genealogical approach denies both of these 
assumptions by tracing the "conditions of possibility" of a particular topic: "what 
combination of circumstances in dispersed and seemingly unconnected fields of social 
activity combines in such a way as to give rise to some outcome?" (Ibid.). 
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An analytics of governance: 
As an analysis of law as governance, this thesis is part of a wider analytics of government 
within our current mode of political rationality, neo-liberalism. An analytics of 
government is concerned primarily with how knowledge is used within programmes 
aimed at directing and reforming conduct. "An analytics of government thus views 
practices in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which 'truth' is 
produced in social, cultural and political practices" (Dean, 1999: 18). Those "truths" 
become the means by which we govern others but also ourselves. By examining 
programmes, such as the community treatment order, as a means of governing a certain 
category of subject, psychiatric subjects found incapable of consenting to treatment, I aim 
to show how this practice is also symbolic of how we govern ourselves — how we govern 
ourselves in adherence to the duty to be well. 
Dean refers to the types of knowledge that are formed by, but also inform governance as 
the "episteme of government" (1999, 31). An analytics of government examines "the 
emergence of particular 'regimes of truth' concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of 
speaking truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs 
of so doing" (Rose, 1999b, 19). These studies are concerned with the "conditions of 
possibility" for those "regimes of truth" (ibid.). Likewise, this study of capacity to 
consent examines what "conditions of possibility" - social, political, economic, and 
forms of expertise (i.e., from the "psy sciences") - made possible the contemporary way 
capacity is determined and what strategies are aimed at the incapable psychiatric subject. 
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Along with giving rise to specific forms of knowledge and truth, practices of governing 
give rise to specific identities, both of the governed and the governors. Dean points to 
specific questions of identity that make up an analytics of government: 
[WJhat forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of 
government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What 
statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise 
authority (from politicians and bureaucrats to professionals and therapists)? What 
forms of conduct are expected of them? What duties and rights do they have? 
How are these capacities and attributes to be fostered? How are these duties 
enforced and rights ensured? How are certain aspects of conduct problematized? 
How are they then reformed? How are certain individuals and populations made 
to identify with certain groups, to become virtuous and active citizens, and so on? 
(Dean, 1999,32). 
These are the forms of questions to be asked concerning the identity of a psychiatric 
subject as "incapable of consenting." Specifically, I argue that the neo-liberal practices 
of governing the incapable psychiatric subject seek to transform that subject into an 
entrepreneurial subject - one responsible for their own health status, for reducing the 
"risk of harm" to themselves and to others - one obliged to be free - even if that freedom 
remains ultimately constrained. 
Commonsense 
An analytics of government challenges "commonsense" notions and "taken-for-granted" 
ways of understanding topics (Dean, 1999, 21), such as, in this case, mental capacity. 
Foucault, for example, challenges the common-sense reality of topics such as insanity or 
illness. In doing so, he is not denying their existence but questioning the taken-for-
granted approach to these subjects (Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 4). An analytics of 
government examines the means by which these commonsense notions arise and take on 
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the status of truth. This involves analyzing various "regimes of practice" which 
intermesh and which involve a variety of systems (ibid.), in this case the mental health 
and justice systems. "Regimes of practice" are "historically constituted assemblages 
through which we do such things as cure, care, relieve, punish, educate, train and 
counsel" (Dean, 1999, 30). These practices of government also assume particular types 
of subjects, with particular "capacities" and liberties. In order to examine the work of 
governing, then, one examines how subjects are formed and what capacity for agency is 
assumed (Dean, 1999, 29). Indeed, the legal governance of psychiatric subjects assumes 
certain (lack of) capabilities and actions, which will be fully examined in the following 
chapters. 
Hunt and Wickham's Method Principles for the Sociology of Law as Governance: 
Hunt and Wickham have incorporated the features of a genealogical account of 
governance and formulated a way to examine specifically how law governs conduct. 
They propose four principles for this method of inquiry, which I will use as a guide to the 
"sociology of consent and capacity law as governance." 
Principle 1: The sociology of law as governance works to compile social 
facts in a genealogical manner (1994, 117). In other words, one looks at 
the "conditions of possibility" behind these social facts by asking "how 
are these social facts possible" (1994, 118). 
Principle 2: The tools employed by the sociology of law as governance 
are attention to detail and careful generalization (1994, 120). This method 
examines the "attempt-failure-attempt" cycle of legal management, since 
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legal attempts at control are never total and always contain elements of 
incompleteness. Attempts to achieve control are met with resistance. 
Complete control, according to Foucault, is the result of relations of 
violence, not relations of power. Techniques and strategies of legal 
governance are investigated, as well as any challenges made to these 
techniques (1994, 120). While generalizations are carefully made, they 
are no guarantee and do not claim to represent the "truth." Therefore, this 
type of inquiry is never used to make predictions (1994, 121). 
Principle 3: The work produced as part of a sociological inquiry of law as 
governance remains distinguished from the way those results are used 
(1994, 122). The details and generalizations made might be used by any 
number of actors for any number of purposes. It "does not produce 
'explanations'" for the social facts it examines (1994, 124). The sociology 
of law as governance addresses "how" questions, not "why" questions. In 
keeping with this principle, the aim of this study on capacity to consent 
law is to add the body of knowledge produced within the growing body of 
work on analytics of governance. 
Principle 4: The sociology of law as governance "must be continuously 
aware of its own institutional nature" (125) - that it too produces and (re) 
produces knowledge about subjects. 
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An analysis of Ontario's legal governance of incapable psychiatric patients: 
The jurisdiction of Ontario was chosen because the most important case on this issue, the 
2003 Supreme Court decision in Starson v. Swayze, emerged from the Ontario courts. 
Additionally, a preliminary search for case law covering all of the common law provinces 
(e.g., excluding Quebec) was conducted using the National Reporter System database. 
Of the cases listed under the topic "Persons of Unsound Mind" (which includes cases 
involving commitment orders and findings with respect to capacity to consent to 
treatment), 58 of the 61 cases found were brought before Ontario courts. It should be 
noted that not all of these cases involve treatment decisions; some involve the capacity to 
administer property or the determination of involuntary status. 
The object of analysis is case law from Ontario's Consent and Capacity Review Board, 
Superior Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. The goal was to 
gather cases where the patient was appealing a physician's finding that they were 
incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment. This includes patients who were 
involuntarily admitted to a facility as well as patients who were placed on community 
treatment orders. 
Cases from the Ontario Superior Court, Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada 
were found using a combined search method designed to yield all of the cases available to the 
public. The first database used was the Canadian Legal Information Institute website database 
('http://www.canlii.com). Using the query, "capacity to consent" + "consent and capacity 
board" yielded thirty-two (32) cases in December, 2005. The term "consent and capacity 
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board" was used since all cases from patients appealing their incapable status originate in this 
tribunal and any cases on appeal from the Board make reference to that decision. It was 
therefore a means of eliminating hundreds of cases that were irrelevant to the present study. 
Nine of the thirty-two cases were discarded due to irrelevance since they dealt with questions of 
capacity to consent to admission into a long-term care facility or a question of a substitute 
decision-makers consent to treatment to prolong life, capacity to manage property or a question 
of costs of the proceedings. In total, twenty-three (23) cases were gathered from this query. 
In May, 2006 another search was performed using the Lexis-Nexis legal database search engine 
using the query [incapacity (or capacity) + consent + psychiatric + treatment]. This yielded a 
total of 92 cases in Ontario. Many of these were irrelevant since they dealt with questions of 
capacity to manage property, admission to a long-term care facility, or criminal or family law 
matters. After eliminating the irrelevant cases and duplicate cases found from the Canadian 
Legal information Institute, five (5) cases were added to the sample. The remaining two cases 
were found by searching the Indexes to the Ontario Reports and Administrative Law Reports 
volumes under the categories "Mental Health" and "Persons of Unsound Mind." In all, thirty 
(30) cases were analyzed from the Supreme Court of Canada, Ontario's Court of Appeal and 
Superior Court levels. 
Decisions from the Capacity and Consent Board (CCB) were retrieved from the Canadian Legal 
Information Institute website database (http://www.canlii.com/on/cas/onccb/). Decisions on 
this site have only been made available since June 1, 2003. However, certain selected decisions 
before this date have also been made available through this site. Access to these decisions is 
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therefore limited in scope and is not representative of the complete timeline of cases from this 
tribunal. The present analysis is likewise limited in that respect. Given these limitations, I 
included only cases from this database where patients applied for a review of a finding of 
incapacity to consent to a community treatment order. The "treatment" these subjects have been 
found incapable of consenting to in these cases is the "treatment order" itself. This affords an 
analysis of the emerging jurisprudence on CTOs as a means of governing certain incapable 
psychiatric subjects. In total, sixteen (16) cases from the CCB were analyzed. It should be 
noted, however, that two cases from the Superior Court also deal with the capacity to consent to 
a community treatment order. 
A discourse analysis of legal decisions: 
The following five elements of Foucauldian discourse analysis will be applied to the 
written decisions: 1. Statements about capacity to consent and mental disorder/illness that 
give us knowledge about these concepts; 2. The rules which govern the ways we can and 
cannot talk about capacity to consent and the mental disorders underlying that capacity; 
3. Statements that describe subjects who resist their status as incapacitated; 4. How 
particular knowledge about this phenomena becomes dominant, thus acquiring authority 
and the status of "truth" about the concept and what knowledge about the concept 
becomes subverted; and 5. The institutional practices directed at regulating the conduct of 
these subjects - i.e., the psychiatric treatment proposed, and the institutional 
arrangements (adapted from Hall, 1997, 45). 
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Given the foregoing, a number of questions will be posed to the texts: What are the ways 
of describing the subjects and their capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment? What 
criteria lead the examining psychiatrists, capacity board members, or court justices to 
pronounce as to the patient's capacity to consent to treatment? What is the diagnosed 
psychiatric disorder? Is there evidence of opposing expert opinions on the diagnosis? Is 
the subject described as recognizing their condition as a mental illness? Is this made to 
be a determining factor in the finding of incapacity? What pronouncements are made in 
the decisions with respect to freedom, autonomy, rights, risks and harm (e.g. risk of harm 
to the self, to others, risks involved in following or not following the proposed 
treatment)? What pronouncements are made concerning the proposed or past treatments 
(e.g. their effectiveness, necessity or side effects)? Was the finding of incapacity 
overturned? 
An analysis based on these questions will be presented in chapters four, five and six. 
This analysis will explore the dominant and counter discourses surrounding capacity to 
consent and the formation of the identity of the incapable psychiatric subject. The ways 
of defining, thinking about and acting upon incapacity will be discussed. I will show 
how the dominant discourse on incapacity to consent to psychiatric treatment is aligned 
with the dominant form of political rationality, neo-liberalism, and what that says about 
our "freedom to choose" on a broader level. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Truth Obligation: Insight Into Illness 
This is the first of three chapters presenting an analysis of Ontario's capacity to consent 
case law. Through this analysis I aim to show how the concept of capacity to consent to 
psychiatric treatment is understood, what ways of talking about it dominate and take on 
the status of "truth" and what ways are discounted, as enunciated in these official psycho-
legal documents. I will examine how these texts reconcile the competing goals of 
capacity to consent legislation: to uphold autonomy rights while reducing the risk of 
harm. I will also show what these texts say about psychiatric subjects and our 
understanding of the incapable psychiatric subject. Finally, I will examine the strategies 
aligned with capacity to consent law, namely, how the goals of capacity to consent 
decisions are aligned with the doctrine of neo-liberalism. 
The official definition of capacity to consent is found at section 4(1) of the Health Care 
Consent Act: 
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a 
personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that 
is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal 
assistance service, as the case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision. 
The discussion in Canada's leading case on capacity to consent, Starson v. Swayze47, specifies 
how that definition is operationalized. The legal determination of capacity to consent to 
psychiatric treatment involves three considerations: 1) the patient's insight into their condition, 
Starson v. Swayze [2003] 304 N.R. 326 (SCC) 
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2) the evidence of treatment effectiveness, and 3) the goals and consequences of treatment or 
lack of treatment. 
Regarding the first matter, the patient's insight, the Supreme Court argued "... if the 
patient's condition results in him being unable to recognize that he is affected by its 
manifestations, he will be unable to apply the relevant information to his circumstances, 
and unable to appreciate the consequences of his decision." Starson, they found, was 
able to meet this criteria and was therefore deemed capable of making his own treatment 
decisions. 
The second matter under consideration was whether or not the psychiatrists could show 
evidence of benefits resulting from the treatments previously forced on Professor 
Starson. The Court of Appeal concluded that the psychiatrists showed no evidence in 
this regard. Dr. Swayze even admitted that none of the drugs Professor Starson had 
received permitted him to function even "adequately", and that it was "unclear" whether 
they ever would. Moreover, Starson explained that the side effects of the treatments had 
been "the most horrible experiences of my life." For these reasons, the Court of Appeal 
described Starson's medication refusal as "logical" and noted that he "prefers to work on 
his problems in a therapeutic relationship with Dr. Posner, without taking psychiatric 
medications."51 For Starson, meeting the capacity criteria confers a right to choose a 
* Starson v. Swayze [2003] 304 N.R. 326 (SCC), par. 79. 
9
 Starson v. Swayze (2001) 146 O.A.C. 121,201 D.L.R. (4th) 123, 33 Admin. L.R. (3d) 315, par. 11. 
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 Starson v. Swayze (2001) 146 O.A.C. 121, 201 D.L.R. (4th) 123, 33 Admin. L.R. (3d) 315, par. 11. 
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counter mode of treatment, therapy, whereas, had he been found incapable he would have 
been forced to comply with the dominant mode of treatment, psychopharmaceuticals. 
The potential consequences of treatment or a lack of treatment was the third matter 
considered. Starson's psychiatrists stated their treatment goal was the "normalization" of 
Starson's brain. However, the Court quickly pointed out the potential problem of 
normalizing measures: 
The intended effect of the psychiatric medications was to slow down Professor 
Starson's thinking to more "normal" levels. The medication would slow his brain 
to the point where he cannot pursue the one thing that gives his life meaning: his 
scientific research.52 
For Starson, "normalizing" would render him unable to pursue his work. In this case, the 
consequences of treatment were considered worse than the consequences of a lack of 
treatment since the proposed treatments failed to show any benefits in the past and the 
perceived consequence of treatment was undesirable. 
In this and the following chapters, I will examine how each of these considerations get 
taken into account by the Consent and Capacity Board and the Courts and what debates 
surrounding these questions say about freedom, autonomy, security, the risk of harm, 
and, ultimately the obligation to adhere to neo-liberal ideals. 
This first chapter will examine the means by which subjects are determined to be capable 
or incapable of forming consent. The intersection of legal and psychiatric discourses will 
be discussed as will the point at which the legal and psychiatric arguments divide. Since 
52
 Starson v. Swayze (2001) 146 O.A.C. 121,201 D.L.R. (4th) 123, 33 Admin. L.R. (3d) 315, par. 12. 
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the subject's status of "incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment" was overturned 
in only eight of the forty-six cases (and three of these referred to the same patient, Scott 
Starson), it is evident that, in practice, an affinity exists between the legal and psychiatric 
discourses on capacity to consent. The dividing point, however, I argue, lies where the 
subject is either able or unable to articulate insight into their condition. This insight 
affords the subject the freedom to exercise their right to self-determination. Insight is 
thus a condition of freedom, including the freedom to take "risks" with their health. 
Failure to meet the conditions of freedom results in the obligation to be healthy in line 
with the "duty to be well." Insight, in these texts, is equated with capacities for self-
knowledge and self-care, in other words, capacities of the neo-liberal entrepreneurial 
subject. 
While the discourse on insight into illness is upheld in line with the dominant medical 
model on psychiatric illness, some limitations are placed by the Courts on the extent to 
which a patient must articulate knowledge of their condition in line with that held by 
psychiatric experts. In these cases, law exercises its authority over psychiatry. This is 
most notable where psychiatrists adopt a "best interests" argument. While such an 
argument is intrinsic to a therapeutic "right to treatment" doctrine, it extends beyond the 
boundaries of the appearance of scientificity required of an objectifying practice. 
In chapter five I examine competing notions of risk of harm found in the legal decisions. 
What gets turned into an object of risk according to the texts and how are debates 
surrounding those risk objects resolved? These cases weigh the risks and benefits of 
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treatment against the risks and benefits of non treatment. The discourse concerning those 
risks changes over the historical timeline of the capacity to consent case law. As the 
arsenal of "newer and better" psychopharmaceuticals was developed, failure on the part 
of the psychiatric subject to "see the light" vis-a-vis their benefits gets taken as "proof of 
unreasonableness and leads to a finding of incapacity. Dominant and counter discourses 
on these risks and the capacity of subjects to "reasonably" negotiate them emerge from 
these texts. It is evident that voices of the "sane" dominate over the marginalized voices 
of the "insane." 
In chapter six I show the alignment between the goals of enforced treatment of the 
mentally incapable and the rationalities of neo-liberalism. Finding a psychiatric subject 
incapable of consenting is a means of legitimating forced psychopharmaceutical 
treatment. Through this treatment attempts are made to "normalize" the subject, to bring 
about freedom from the manifestations of their conditions, and, ultimately, to produce an 
entrepreneurial subject: a responsible, risk-adverse, self-governing agent who is in charge 
of his/her wellbeing. 
This strategy of legal governance of the incapable psychiatric subject, I argue, legitimizes 
the province's divestment in mental health care facilities while simultaneously increasing 
its interventionist powers. This exemplifies the contradictory nature of neo-liberal 
governance. Furthermore, it serves as a microcosm of the exercise of freedom, autonomy 
and security at large: we are all subject to the doctrine of contemporary 
entrepreneurialism - the choices we are free to make are constrained to the extent that we 
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are obliged to direct ourselves as responsible, risk-adverse citizens. Foucault's concept 
of the panopticon as a metaphor for self-governance is instrumental here. Since one can 
never be certain whether or not they are being observed, each subject conducts him- or 
herself as though they are under constant surveillance (Rabinow, 1984, 19). Where one 
fails to self-govern, imprisonment follows. 
The concepts of capacity, and its precursor, competency, have been described as "gate 
keeping" concepts (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, Somerville, 1994). Somerville goes so 
far as to call competency the "'gate-keeper' of the 'gate-keeping' concepts" (1994, 183). 
Meeting the requirements for competency calls into play the consideration of other 
concepts, namely autonomy and self-determination (Somerville, 1994, 182). In law, 
Somerville notes, the terms "autonomy" and "self-determination" may be used 
interchangeably even though "autonomy refers to the capacity for self-determination [...] 
whereas self-determination refers to the exercise of this capacity''' (1994, 185-186). What 
happens in legal practice, however, is that the determination of individual autonomy gets 
treated as a question of fact "usually by a court as a passing reference to a given person's 
state of mind" (1994, 188). Questions of capacity, autonomy and self-determination 
therefore rely upon the intersection of law and psychiatry. I will expand upon the affinity 
between legal and psychiatric discourses and the emergence of a "psycho-legal" 
discourse further in this chapter. 
As a gate-keeper concept, questions of capacity necessarily set up a division between 
"capable" and "incapable." I therefore argue that capacity to consent judgments employ 
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dividing practices (Foucault, 1982); those practices which divide the sick from healthy, 
mad from sane, and, in this case, capable from incapable. "Essentially, 'dividing 
practices' are modes of manipulation that combine the mediation of a science (or pseudo-
science) and the practice of exclusion - usually in a spatial sense, but always in a social 
one" (Rabinow, 1984, 8). In these cases, the incapable are separated in a spatial sense 
through involuntary institutionalization or, for those governed by community treatment 
orders, by their obligation to comply with the stipulations of that order while living in the 
community, which may include living in specified housing. 
Insight and the Medical Model 
The division of psychiatric subjects along the line of insight is legitimated by the 
dominant understanding of mental illness. This model argues that approximately half of 
all people diagnosed with a severe mental illness do not agree with the assessment of 
their condition and, consequently, either do not seek, or resist, treatment (Gray and 
O'Reilly, 2005, 20). The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) began associating lack of insight with mood 
disorders in 1987 (version DSM-III-R). For example, under the associative features of 
Bipolar disorder it is noted that "[frequently the person does not recognize that he or she 
is ill and resists all efforts to be treated" (1987, 216). Critics of capacity to consent laws, 
however, argue that the lack of insight is too frequently conflated with mental incapacity 
such that failure to recognize or agree with a diagnosis of mental illness is typically 
viewed as evidence of incapacity to consent. 
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According to the capacity to consent decisions, the psychiatric subject's recognition of 
the presence of a mental illness, even if they don't agree with the label, is paramount for 
capacity to consent to treatment to be recognized. The patient, however, has an upward 
battle to win in order to convince the courts of that recognition. As Holstein has argued, 
judges in psychiatric hearings operate against the background of an assumption of 
madness, therefore, the patient's reliability is consistently challenged. "Cast in this light, 
their testimony and behaviour is always suspect, their credibility is constantly challenged 
and their claimed capabilities discounted. Behaviour that might pass for 'normal' or 
'competent' is regarded as artificial or transitory" (Holstein, 1987, 155). 
Part of that challenge is due to the fact that dominant understanding of mental illness is 
that of a state in which the individual's ability to reason with respect to their mental 
condition is eroded. This association is also held to be true by the courts. In the 
concluding arguments in Duarte v. Kingston Psychiatric Hospital (1999) the Court notes 
that, 
[S]chizophrenia does not provide the sufferer with the ability to diagnose the fact 
that he or she suffers from the illness [...] it is not enough to say that because one 
understands about schizophrenia, that he or she must therefore not have the 
illness. The medical authorities have diagnosed the appellant with the illness, and 
the Board accepted that diagnosis and decided the appellant was not capable with 
respect to treatment of his mental disorder.53 
The medical model is thus mirrored and legitimated in the legal discourse. In this case, 
the patient failed to acknowledge the existence of mental illness in the required manner. 
There is also an assumption made in the above statement that medical authorities have 
access to true knowledge concerning the patient's condition, and that the patient, because 
53
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of his illness, is unable to see this truth. This establishes a situation of disciplinary power 
over the patient by the physician. As Lupton notes, "[fjrom the Foucauldian perspective, 
power as it operates in the medical encounter is a disciplinary power that provides 
guidelines about how patients should understand, regulate and experience their bodies" 
(1997, 99). In this case, the patient's understanding, care of and experience of their 
minds must follow that of the dominant psychiatric model - "one must show one's 
wounds in order to be cured" (Foucault, 1997, 244). 
Failure of Self-Knowledge 
The first consideration, whether or not the patient articulates insight into their illness, is 
viewed, I argue, as a failure of self-knowledge. Closely related to this obligation of self-
knowledge is the obligation of the psychiatric subject to engage in adequate self-care. 
Both are taken as evidence of failure to adhere to the truth obligation imposed by the 
dominant medical model and of an inability to ascribe to the contemporary technologies 
of the self. This conception of mental capacity falls in line with the political doctrine of 
neo-liberalism. "Neo-liberalism calls upon the individual to enter into the process of his 
or her own self-governance through processes of endless self-examination, self-care and 
self-improvement." Those who fail to "care for the self are hence viewed as a public 
health burden (Petersen 1997, 194). Where that process of self-government is not 
forthcoming due to the manifestations of a mental condition, the subject will still have 
those conditions of governance imposed upon her. 
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The extent to which manifestations of a condition erode capacity to consent is discussed 
in the decisions. In D 'Almeida v. Goyer, it was noted that the Courts have established 
that although mental illness may prevent a person from appreciating their illness, "[I]t 
would not be sufficient to say the person lacked capacity solely because they denied any 
illness. The evidence would have to establish that the denial was caused by the illness and 
was not based on some rational ground."54 Where is the line drawn whereby illness is or 
is not the source of denial? What is considered rational? 
Delusions55 are frequently cited as the source of denial and, hence, the inability to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of treatment or a lack of treatment. For 
example, Ms. Howlett, a 79-year-old woman with a history of psychiatric diagnosis, was 
said to suffer from delusions to such a degree that she "lacked the understanding of the 
nature of her illness," and was therefore found to be not mentally competent.56 
In Khan v. St. Thomas, despite finding that the Board had erroneously applied the test for 
capacity, the Court concluded that Ms. Khan was not competent to consent to the 
proposed treatment. The reason given by the Court for this conclusion was that Khan's 
delusions limited her ability to understand the information concerning the intended 
effects of the medication.57 
Again, in Roy v. Furst, the Court specified, 
54
 D 'Almeida v. Gojer [1999] 104 O.T.C. 326, par. 7, my emphasis. 
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 "The hearing of voices has become one of the key limits or mechanisms through which danger and risk 
are adjudicated within both the legal and 'psy' apparatus" (Blackman, 2000: 59). 
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[I]t is not sufficient that a person have an intellectual understanding of the nature 
of his or her illness and the treatment proposed. [...] A person is not mentally 
capable if delusions render him or her incapable of understanding the information 
that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment and/or unable to 
appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of 
decision.58 
The apparent existence of delusions therefore trumps a subject's irrational understanding 
of his or her illness. Establishing that a person is delusional is thus a means by which 
subjects are divided in terms of their capacity to consent. It should, however, be noted 
that the two above cases involve women and that this may be indicative of a gendered 
reading of incapacity. 
Limits to this division were further established in the Starson case. During the lengthy 
course of the Starson trials, it was decided that the existence of a mental disorder or of 
delusions alone does not render the person incapable of consenting. The Superior Court 
ruled: 
[T]he mere presence of a mental disorder is not sufficient to support a finding of 
incapacity, nor is evidence of delusional thinking enough. It must be 
demonstrated that the disorder has rendered the person unable to understand the 
information relevant to decision making and unable to appreciate the 
consequences of a decision.59 
A distinction must be made, it was argued, between the ability to understand information 
and its consequences and the failure to do so. Furthermore, the psychiatrists were 
reminded that the test for capacity "is not to be based on what the attending physicians 
consider to be in the patient's 'best interests:'" 
Roy v. Furst 1999 O.T.C. LEXIS 732; 1999 OTC Uned. 333, par. 10. 
Starson v. Swayze (1999) 22 Admin L.R. (3d) 211, par. 13. 
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[C]apable individuals have the right to take risks and are presumed free to make 
decisions that are considered unreasonable. The test is not whether the choice by 
the patient appears reasonable or wise, but whether the patient is capable, within 
the meaning of the statue, of making the decision. The Board is not to inject its 
own personal values, judgments and priorities into the process.6 
A division is thus established between legal and psychiatric authorities, with law 
exercising its dominance, in this case, over the psychiatric discourse of right to treatment. 
Taking a stand against the "best interests" argument I see as an attempt to set the legal 
discourse away from the paternalistic tendency of psychiatry. 
The Starson case also shows evidence that meeting the truth obligation, by recognizing 
the existence of one's mental illness, allows the subject to put their health and their 
freedom at risk. The patient may well continue to be chained to their delusions as a result 
of their deteriorating condition, within the confines of a psychiatric institution, as was the 
case with Starson, yet retain their right to self-determination. This decision is in line with 
Drane's model of incompetency: "To be competent to make apparently irrational and 
very dangerous choices, the patient must appreciate the implications of the medical 
information for his or her life" (Glass, 1997, 23). 
While the legal and psychiatric discourses agree on the condition of insight, the legal 
discourse differs in degree to which the subject must adhere to the psychiatric "truth." 
Neto v. Klukach61 was a case of a "37 year old separated mother of one child". At the 
time of the hearing, she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was pregnant with her 
second child. Dr. Klukach based his finding of incapacity on Ms. Neto's refusal to 
60
 Neto v. Klukach, [2004] O.T.C. 138 (ON S.C.), par. 11. 
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 Neto v. Klukach, [2004] O.T.C. 138 (ON S.C.) 
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acknowledge that she was bipolar and what he argued were her delusional beliefs about 
Lithium and cough syrup. The Court, however, concluded that to be found incapable, her 
delusional beliefs would have to pertain specifically to her proposed medications.62 Neto 
was therefore declared free and capable of making her own treatment choices. 
A finding of incapacity to consent, on the other hand, effectively ends the patient's right 
to see their disorder in a manner inconsistent with the dominant psychiatric discourse, as 
was the case for Paul Conway: 
Until 1996, Paul Conway was legally entitled to refuse to consent to treatment on 
the basis of his views regarding his own mental health, whether or not those views 
conformed to psychiatric assessments of his mental health. However, he is no 
longer entitled to do so, since he is no longer capable of giving or refusing 
fin 
consent to treatment. 
Failure of Self-Care 
Taking care of oneself requires knowing [connaitre] oneself. Care of the self is, 
of course, knowledge [connaissance] of the self [...] but also knowledge of a 
number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and 
prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is 
where ethics is linked to the game of truth (Foucault, 1997, 285). 
Failure of self-care is also taken as evidence of a lack of capacity to consent according to 
the case law. Furthermore, it is a risk associated with remaining untreated. For example, 
in Kirpiev v. Peat, the patient was described as being very well read and of above average 
intelligence. However, the patient was found to have "a very dramatic self neglect." 64 
This was evidenced by using unhygienic self-catheterization practices, living in filthy 
conditions in a rented motel room, having a carton of eggs in the oven with the oven on, 
Neto v. Klukach, [2004] O.T.C. 138 (ON S.C.), par. 40. 
Conway v. Jacques, (June 17, 2002) ONCA C36001, par. 39. 
Kirpiev v. Peat, [2002] O.T.C. 488 (ON S.C.), par. 13. 
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and suffering from mal-nutrition. According to the Board, "the appellant was unable to 
appreciate the reasonable foreseeable consequences of his refusal to take anti-psychotic 
medication."65 The Board also found "that the appellant suffered from paranoia which 
posed future physical harm to himself and potential criminal activity towards others."66 
This conclusion is said to stem from the patient's failure of self-care as well as his denial 
(si 
of illness. Self-neglect, risk of harm and dangerousness are hence all associated with 
the incapable psychiatric subject. 
The "Catch-22:" "Accepting treatment means I'm ill" 
Consistent in the legal decisions is the expression of various Catch-22 situations. 
Denying illness is equated with incapacity, which leads to forced medication; 
acknowledging illness means one is in need of medication which once again leads to the 
risk of being medicated against one's will. Some subjects were themselves capable of 
articulating this dilema. For example, in Duarte v. Kingston Psychiatric Hospital (2000), 
Mr. Duarte stated, "Because I understand about schizophrenia, I know I don't suffer from 
it, therefore I can refuse treatment because to accept treatment would be tantamount to 
admitting I had the illness." 
Similarly, when Professor Starson was before the Superior Court, and asked whether he 
agreed he had a psychiatric illness, he testified that this question left him in a "Catch 22" 
position: 
65
 Kirpiev v. Peat, [2002] O.T.C. 488 (ON S.C.), par. 22. 
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He said that if he admitted having a mental illness then the psychiatrists would 
insist on treating him with medications he did not want to take. On the other hand, 
if he did not admit it, then the psychiatrists would say he "lacked insight" into his 
illness and use that as an indication of incompetence and then force treatment 
upon him.69 
Starson did however concede to having mental problems and that these problems had 
over the years made his life difficult. He also agreed that he "exhibited the symptoms of 
these labels that you give." The Board, for its part, dismissed Starson's 
acknowledgements as insignificant and argued that Professor Starson was in "almost total 
denial" of his "mental disorder."71 This failure to acknowledge the existence of illness, to 
the Board, meant that Starson could not possibly understand the information concerning 
the proposed treatment provided to him since, they argued, he could not relate that 
information to his particular disorder.72 
Dominant discourses will define what is understood as the "truth" at a particular 
historical moment, but "counter-discourses" are also present - those subverted discourses 
that resist and pose a challenge to the dominant discourse (Carabine, 2001, 268). The 
dominant discourse of capacity to consent holds that insight into illness is a precondition 
of capacity. This discourse emerged in psychiatry and is appropriated by law to the 
extent that is argued as a legitimate limitation to the right of self-determination. Capacity 
confers the right to take "risks" with one's health, although, it should be pointed out, that 
legal arguments about the right and freedom of the capable subject to take risks and make 
by
 Starson v. Swayze (1999) 22 Admin L.R. (3d) 211, par. 30. 
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unreasonable choices only occurred in cases where the subject was an involuntary 
patient, not living in the community on a treatment order. 
While in the majority of cases psychiatric discourses dominate, there are cases where 
legal authorities place limitations on that dominance. Psychiatric subjects still need to 
hold to certain "truths" concerning their condition, however, they do not need to 
appropriate the labels used by psychiatry nor are the manifestations of their condition 
always equated with a lack of capacity. The law specifies that these manifestations, such 
as delusions, only result in incapacity where they erode the patient's ability to understand 
the information relevant to their treatment and appreciate its consequences. 
Most importantly, however, is the exercise of legal authority over "best interests" 
arguments made by psychiatric experts. I argue that the paternalistic doctrine of "best 
interests" extends beyond the boundaries of the practice of objectification. It does not 
give the appearance of a scientific mode of objectifying the subject. Furthermore, the 
rejection of these arguments by Court justices breaks with the tendency of Law to make 
determinations of what is in an individual's "best interests." 
A feature of neo-liberalism is "the active creation of new institutions and regulations of 
state and society" (Keil, 2002, 581). Smith (1989) argues that where medicine (including 
psychiatry) and law intersect they are experienced as a new specialized expertise, 
medico-legal expertise. Where law is invested with the authority to make judgments of 
facts of law and not judgments of psychiatric fact, the emergence of specialized tribunals 
99 
and therapeutic courts, such as drug courts and mental health courts, combine these 
authorities (Slovenko, 2004; Smith, 1989). Comprised as it is of a panel of both members 
of the bar and psychiatric professionals, Ontario's Consent and Capacity Board is one 
such newly emerged institution, in this case of psycho-legal expertise. Decisions from 
the Board, as seen here and in the following chapters, are more closely aligned with the 
dominant psychiatric discourses. Given that the "psy sciences" have been so 
instrumental in constructing both the entrepreneurial subject and neo-liberal forms of 
governance, the "psycho-legal" discourses emerging from this regulatory body have a 




It is acknowledged that neuroleptic drugs are not all sweetness and light. 
For some they contain immense risks of nervous disorders and debilitating 
side effects. The case law of the United States overflows with the running 
debate between proponents of neuroleptics and those who say the risks of 
devastating side effects are totally unacceptable.73 
The second consideration, the efficacy of the proposed treatment, weighs the risk of harm 
to self from side effects against the risk of harm to self from non-treatment. Determining 
the efficacy of the proposed treatment involves the scientific objectification of the patient 
through the implementation of strategies of disciplinary power. 
The central strategies of disciplinary power are observation, examination, 
measurement and the comparison of individuals against an established norm, 
bringing them into a field of visibility. It is exercised not primarily through direct 
coercion or violence (although it must be emphasized that these strategies are still 
used from time to time), but rather through persuading its subjects that certain 
ways of behaving and thinking are appropriate for them (Lupton, 1997, 99). 
This statement is relevant because it highlights the situation of incapable psychiatric 
subjects. Strategies of "direct coercion or violence" are still used. However, new 
techniques of legal governance aim to persuade incapable psychiatric subjects to make 
"responsible" choices, however restrained they may be. 
Nettleton points out that within the contemporary form of governance, experts present 
various risks which individuals are called upon to actively negotiate (1997, 208). This 
relationship governs the field of possible actions a subject may take (Foucault, 1982, 220-
221). Health and health policy discourses however presuppose agency: that subjects are 
Fleming v. Reid(1990) .... (182 c) 
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free to challenge the knowledge presented within such discourses (Nettleton, 1997, 217). 
In the cases before us, the range of possible ways subjects may act vis-a-vis their 
diagnosis and treatment is constrained by both their status as incapable of consenting to 
treatment as well as by the symptoms of their conditions. They are nevertheless 
"persuaded that certain ways of behaving and thinking are appropriate for them." In 
these cases, the proper way of behaving and thinking is to comply with a proposed 
regime of treatment and to acknowledge the benefits it may afford them. Indeed, failure 
on the part of the patient to "see the light" and agree with the benefits of proposed 
treatments and risks of remaining untreated results in the exercise of psycho-legal power 
to compel their treatment compliance. 
An early example of the exercise of psycho-legal control can be found in the case of T 
and the Board of Review (1983). In this case the court was to decide whether ECT 
treatments fell into the definition of "psychosurgery" and whether or not the Board could 
authorize the physician to perform this treatment despite Ms. T's competent refusal. 
Justice Van Camp arrived at his decision after a lengthy discussion about the wide-
ranging and inconclusive evidence concerning the effectiveness of ECT. Leaving aside a 
number of studies showing the existence of brain tissue damage, Justice Van Camp chose 
the opinion of Dr. Berry that, "apart from the isolated occurrence of extremely rare 
complications, properly administered electroconvulsive therapy does not have any 
permanent effect on nerve cell bodies, conducting tracts or the continuity of normal brain 
tissue." ECT treatments were thereby ordered for the patient, despite the fact that she 
Re T and Board of Review for the Western Region (1983) 44 O.R. (2d) 153, par. 162 g. 
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had been found competent to consent, thus overriding the patient's competent medical 
wishes. 
While the psychiatric mainstream touts the effectiveness of psychopharmaceuticals, the 
benefits of these drugs have been challenged by others. For example, the Court of 
Appeal in Fleming v. Reid and Gallagher (1991), stressed that "[neuroleptics] are not a 
cure." In this case, a detailed list of potential side effects was provided, including 
dystonia (muscle spasms, particularly in the face and arms, irregular flexing, writhing or 
grimacing and protrusion of the tongue); akathesia (internal restlessness or agitation, an 
inability to sit still); akinesia (physical immobility and lack of spontaneity); and 
Parkinsonisms (mask-like facial expression, drooling, muscle stiffness, tremors, shuffling 
gait). The drugs can also cause a number of non-muscular side effects, such as blurred 
vision, dry mouth and throat, weight gain, dizziness, fainting, depression, low blood 
pressure, cardiovascular changes and, on occasion, sudden death. 
The most potentially serious side effect of anti-psychotic drugs is a condition 
known as tardive dyskinesia. This is a generally irreversible neurological disorder 
characterized by involuntary, rhythmic and grotesque movement of the face, 
mouth, tongue, and jaw. The patient's extremities, neck, back and torso can also 
become involved. Tardive dyskinesia generally develops after prolonged use of 
the drugs, but it may appear after short term treatment and sometimes appears 
even after treatment has been discontinued. In short, it appears that although 
these drugs apparently operate so as to benefit many patients by alleviating their 
psychotic symptoms, they also carry with them significant, and often 
unpredictable, short term and long term risks of harmful side effects.75 
Reactions to medications are not only physically harmful but have important 
consequences for how the psychiatric subject is viewed. Breggin (1994, infra) suggests 
Fleming v. Reid and Gallagher (1991) 4 O.R. (3d) 74, p. 83-84. 
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that the bodily changes resulting from the chemical reactions to these medications 
actually mimic and are mistaken for symptoms of illness (in Fabris, 2006, 58-59). 
This calls to mind Rose's observation that advanced liberal democracies are increasingly 
becoming "psychopharmacological societies" comprised of "neurochemical selves" 
(2003, 47). He argues that labels are attributed to psychiatric illnesses as phenomena that 
respond to and are potentially treatable by the pharmaceutical developed for it, such that 
psychiatric illnesses increasingly become defined by the particular reactions they have to 
given drugs (Rose, 2003, 52). 
"Newer and better" medications: 
It has been argued that since the dominant position on mental illness is the "brain-disease 
model," chemical solutions become the sole response to improving the lives of subjects. 
There is an absence of incentive for promoting anything other than "better living through 
chemistry" (Bassman, 2005, 490). Ontario's capacity to consent case law tends to bear 
this out. 
When second-generation anti-psychotic medications arrived, they were presented as 
being more effective and having fewer risks of side-effects than first-generation anti-
psychotics. However, among the risks of the newer anti-psychotics commonly cited in 
the case law are weight gain, increased cholesterol levels, diabetes and heart conditions. 
What gets argued by psychiatric authorities is that if the patient is unable to appreciate 
that these new medications offer greater benefits than the old ones, then he or she must be 
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incapable of giving consent. This argument was clearly presented by Dr. Jacques in 
Conway v. Jacques: 
He is now categorically refusing and consequently been denied the opportunity to 
try the newer atypical antipsychotic medications which not only have fewer side 
effects but also are considerably more effective in dealing with certain symptoms 
in patients. The institution of these medications has in fact gone as far as to have 
resulted in certain persons improving to the extent that they have been released 
from this maximum secure facility when before the availability of these 
medications, these individuals would not ever be considered for release.76 
Potential release and freedom are hence seen as goals of the newer 
psychopharmaceuticals. The benefits of these chemical treatments are upheld in such a 
manner as to deny any challenge based upon the negative effects experienced from their 
use. This is important since subjects' experiences with these medications are often 
subverted while making assumptions about the benevolence of psychiatric experts and 
the treatments they prescribe (Fabris, 2006, 14). 
Treatment Refusal Equals Incapacity: 
There has been a historic tendency within both law and psychiatry to equate the refusal of 
treatment with the lack of capacity to consent to treatment. Gendreau observes that 
[Traditional psychiatric presumption that the acceptance of a treatment is, by 
definition, reasonable and healthy and that a refusal of a treatment is not only 
presumed unreasonable but also a symptom of mental illness. So understood, 
overriding a patient's decision is presumed justified when this decision is a 
refusal, whether the patient is competent or not (1997, 276). 
An example of this presumption can be found in Khan v. St. Thomas Psychiatric 
Hospital. The appellant's counsel "argued that the board, like the attending physician, 
wrongly equated competence with acceptance of treatment and incompetence with 
Conway v. Jacques, (2002) ONCA C36001, par. 19 
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refusal." Her counsel explained that Dr. Komer found Ms. Thompson incapable of 
consenting to treatment only subsequent to her refusal to continue taking medication she 
had previously been taking voluntarily.78 The Superior Court nonetheless sided with Dr. 
Komer and the Board's decision, stating, "Ms. Khan can understand the medication and 
its side effects, but cannot apply them to herself. [Dr. Komer] said she does not 
understand the benefits of taking it because she does not believe she is ill." The legal 
and psychiatric discourses converge here where the patient fails to meet the insight 
obligation. 
However, in Boimier v. Swaminath (2003), the Superior Court granted Mr. Boimier's 
appeal from the Board's decision to uphold a finding of incapacity to consent. The 
reason given for overturning the Board's decision was that this was a classic case of 
equating treatment refusal with incapacity. After the Board refused to grant him a 
release, Boimier refused to take the medications he had been voluntarily consuming up to 
that point. When Dr. Swaminath saw that Mr. Boimier had stopped taking his 
medication, a decision with which he did not agree, he declared the patient to be 
incapable.80 
In addition to equating treatment refusal with incapacity, failure to acknowledge the 
benefits of treatment on the part of patients is also considered evidence of incapacity to 
consent. In Boimier's case, it was concluded that Dr. Swaminath's declaration of 
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incapacity rested on his argument "that the patient does not understand that he might 
benefit from treatment and that treatment has helped him in the past."81 The Judge in this 
case, however, argued that, "I have no doubt that Dr. Swaminath had his patient's best 
interests in mind when he prescribed this medication and when he declared Mr. Boimier 
incapable. The patient's best interests, however, are not the issue in this appeal." 
Boimier was hence deemed capable of making his own treatment decisions. Again here, 
"best interest" arguments lie outside of the affinity between legal and psychiatric 
discourses. 
Hiltz and Szigeti have found similar evidence of the tendency to equate treatment refusal 
and incapacity in their research: 
The Board rarely receives an application for a review of a finding of treatment 
incapacity from an individual who wishes to receive the recommended treatment 
[...]. In practice, many physicians do not question the capacity of a patient who 
agrees with their treatment recommendation (Hiltz and Szigeti, 2004, 158). 
In contrast to this, recognizing the benefits of medication brings the psychiatric subject 
the freedom to take risks. For example, R.R. acknowledged being helped by medication. 
His community treatment order was therefore revoked since he was found to be capable 
of consenting to it. If he had denied the benefits of medication, he may well have 
remained under that order. 
RR's ability to recognize that he suffered from mental illness and that medication 
had helped him was important and relevant to making a treatment decision. We 
were also satisfied that RR was able at the Hearing to appreciate the reasonably 
81
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foreseeable consequences of making or not making a treatment decision. As a 
result, RR has the right to take risks and to be wrong in his decisions.84 
Risks of Treatment Non-compliance 
In addition to failing to appreciate the benefits of treatment, failure to fully appreciate the 
risks of non-treatment is another situation that potentially leads to a finding of incapacity. 
In Chen v. Hillen (2005) for example, the Court concluded, "On the facts of this case, the 
Board was entitled to conclude that the appellant's acknowledgment that he would 
continue to be hospitalized did not constitute appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of a denial of treatment."85 The patient, presumably, needed to describe 
the specific deterioration of his mental condition that would ensue subsequent to 
remaining untreated. 
Where the "treatment" in question is the "treatment plan" contained in a community 
treatment order, the principle risk associated with not being on the CTO is said to be the 
"decompensation," or mental deterioration, which follows from the subject's treatment 
non-compliance. The conditions for issuing a CTO are met where the subject has a 
history of hospitalization followed by treatment and stabilization, subsequent discharge, 
treatment non-compliance and deterioration, followed by re-admission to a hospital. The 
risks of being off of a CTO are generally described as a lower quality of life due to the 
deterioration of the patient's condition. Absent a treatment order, it is argued, patients 
would fail to attend follow-up appointments and follow their medication routine. L.M., 
for example, is said to be at risk of "being disorganized" and becoming "spaced out." In 
84
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the past, this has led her to neglect her hygiene, leave the stove on thus creating a risk for 
fire, and causing a toilet to overflow. "If not treated, her mental disorder, which [her 
psychiatrist] diagnosed as schizophrenia, likely would result in substantial mental and 
physical deterioration of herself and substantial physical impairment of herself." 
Other risks cited in the judgments include alienation and homelessness. The latter risk, 
homelessness, is supported by Slovenko's observation that the doctrine of the "least 
restrictive alternative," of which CTOs are a part, supported the continued move to 
deinstitutionalization. However, the end result, unfortunately, "is well known: The 
mentally ill sleep on the streets" (2004, 583). The technology of legal governance issued 
in response to this problem is the notorious Safe Streets Act87, legislation aimed at 
criminalizing homelessness and panhandling (Keil, 2002). A full analysis of the 
connections between that legislation and CTO provisions is, however, outside of the 
scope of this paper. 
The "Slippery Slope" Agument: The "Risk of Future Harm" 
According to Rose, the move to constructing individuals as "at risk" creates an extended 
role for "psy experts" - the prediction of future pathology. (Rose, 1998, 94-95). 
This extended role is played out in the "psycho-legal" discourse in the prediction of "risk 
of future harm." The members of the Consent and Capacity Board have argued that the 
CTO criteria do not need to be met at the time of a CTO hearing. It is sufficient to 
determine that a patient will have a future risk of harm in absence of a CTO. This 
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argument, however, was not upheld by the Superior Court. In Haugan v. Whelan (2003), 
the Court referred to this as a "slippery slope" argument. According to the Board, there 
was no need to wait until Haugan met the criteria for a treatment order because once he 
goes off his medication he will be on the road to meeting the criteria of "substantial 
mental or physical impairment" set out in s. 15 (1.1) of the Act. The Court however, 
argued that, according to the psychiatrist's own statements, it would be some two months 
after stopping medication that Haugan would meet that criteria. Furthermore, the judge 
noted it was not at the Board's discretion to arbitrarily determine that one of the elements 
of the legislation was irrelevant. The treatment order was therefore quashed (par. 15). 
There is also evidence that the "revolving door" syndrome need not be present in order 
for a CTO to be issued. The CTO is, as explained, used as a pre-emptive strike, a 
strategy of preventing the mere "risk" of relapse, harm, or dangerousness: 
Counsel's submission was that, since the applicant has had only two 
hospitalisations, the second occurring seven years after the first, it cannot be said 
that he has experienced the "revolving door" pattern (to use his expression) 
described in s.33.1(3). Clearly, it is a purpose of a community treatment order to 
prevent the pattern in question from occurring in the future, if there is evidence 
that such might become the case. Assuming that to be a constant requirement, one 
must ask whether a finding of such a future risk can be made only on the basis of 
the number of admissions that have already occurred and the interval between 
them. If so, what is a sufficient number? What is an acceptable interval? 
However, in our opinion, the confirmation of a CTO does not depend on the 
existence of such a past pattern, nor is it necessary that one is likely to emerge in 
the future.88 
This is a direct example of a risk strategy ostensibly designed to predict and prevent a 
possible eventuality. The assumption is that we need not wait until the patient shows 
signs that they meet the conditions of the CTO or that their lives would be improved by 
Q.S., Re, 2005 CanLII 7112 (ON C.C.B.), www.canlii.com. accessed May 5, 2006 
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being subject thereto; one need only show signs that they are "at risk" of meeting the 
requirements. 
In Kirpiev v. Peat (2002), the Board argued that the patient was at risk of "future physical 
harm to himself and potential criminal activity towards others." The noted risks of the 
proposed treatment to the patient are weight gain, drowsiness, and a past reaction to 
Haldol, which resulted in dystonia. The Court made a statement concerning patient 
autonomy and the balancing of risks but never the less supported the Board's finding of 
incapacity on the basis of future harm and potential dangerousness: 
The right to be free from unwanted medical treatment is a constitutionally 
protected right under Section 7 of the Charter. It must be noted that this is not an 
absolute right and requires a balancing process so as to ensure that the right is not 
lightly disregarded and that any limitations of the right take into consideration the 
risk of harm to the patient and the risk of harm to the public. [...] The person 
found to be incapable loses autonomy over his decision making and to a large 
extent over his person. 
The rights language used by the courts in statements such as these reflects the liberal 
democratic principle of the rule of law (Goonan, Healy and Moynihan, 2000). 
Governmentality theorists note that a rights-based approach tends to mask the tendency 
of legal authorities to be dominated by medicine and to "rubber-stamp views expressed 
by psychiatrists" (Goonan, Healy and Moynihan, 2000, 24). The outcomes of these 
cases, wherein the determination of incapacity to consent is overwhelmingly upheld, 
tends to bear this out. According to Goonan, Healy and Moynihan, 
Insofar as the mentally ill express noncompliant forms of consciousness, 
rights are withheld. Further, not only are rights not extended to them, but 
also it is the very individualizing of rights that makes it possible to 
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withhold them from the mentally ill. When rights have as a precondition 
of entitlement the adoption of the monitored, bourgeois self, the mentally 
ill as a category are denied them (2000: 29-30). 
Once it is established that the patient lacks the capacity to self-monitor their mental 
condition, they are categorized as incapable of making self-directed treatment decisions. 
Their status as incapable removes their right to self-determination. This liberal view of 
the self, Fabris, argues, requires that the agent have the capacity to claim human rights, 
while leaving behind the voices of the marginalized (2006, 17). 
Subverted discourse: Marginalized voices 
The case law on capacity to consent to treatment consistently revolves around the 
subject's failure to have insight into their illness, failure to acknowledge the benefits of 
treatment and failure to make connections between treatment non-compliance and mental 
deterioration on one hand and treatment compliance and improved condition on the other. 
For K.T., failure to "see the connection between the lack of treatment and a deterioration 
in her ability to function" 91is considered evidence of incapacity. On the other hand, any 
acknowledgement on the part of patients of the risks and side-effects of medications is 
consistently subverted. Any insight into the manifestations of side effects and the 
conclusions reached by patients about the short-term and long-term effects of those side 
effects is minimized. Fabris expresses this subversion as a case of voices of "sound" 
minds being heard over the voices of "unsound" minds (2006, 13). 
K.T., Re, 2004 CanLII 43054 (ON C.C.B.), www.canlii.com, accessed May 5, 2006 
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For example, in Thompson's case, her attorney argued that the Board failed to consider 
the issues she raised concerning the medications' side-effects: 
The Appellant complains of adverse side-effects from her medication, namely 
pain at the site of the injection, excessive weight gain, excessive salivation, pain 
in her legs, trouble walking and fatigue. She had been taking the antipsychotic 
drug, clopixol, and the drug Artane, to counteract the side-effects. She says that 
she has been free of medication since the last Treatment Order. She complains 
that she gained almost 50 pounds during her last hospitalization last year, when 
she received these drugs. 
This testimony was dismissed because the Court argued that "[ujnlike Mr. Starson, who 
clearly recognized that he had mental problems, the Appellant steadfastly refuses to 
acknowledge that she has" any.93 This failure to acknowledge her condition, in the eyes 
of both the Board and the Court, leads her to lack the ability to meet the second part of 
the test for capacity, that is, she is "unable to appreciate the reasonable foreseeable 
consequences of a decision or lack of decision regarding her treatment."94 Her evidence, 
however, since it emanates from the voice of an "unsound" mind, is considered 
unreasonable and is therefore discounted. 
Even where evidence does indicate that the subject has an understanding or a degree of 
insight into their condition, it is often rejected. For example, in E.S95., in comparison to 
the "cogent, compelling and credible" evidence that she did suffer from a mental disorder 
offered by the psychiatrist, the Board noted that "Ms. E.S.'s understanding of the 
diagnosis was in the abstract and not as it pertained to her own mental health. In other 
words, she had the mental ability to understand the information but lacked the insight to 
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recognize that it applied to her." That inability was apparently evidenced by her denial 
of the need for treatment and her failure to appreciate the probable consequences of non-
treatment. In the words of the Board's decision, "Ms. E.S. took the prescribed 
medication and met with members of the community treatment team only because of that 
Damoclean threat overhanging her and not because she recognized the need for 
treatment" (referring to the threat of being re-institutionalized). At the hearing Ms. E.S. 
said the consequence of not taking the medication was that she would be "pulled into the 
hospital." The record states that, "[s]he did not see a medical need for psychiatric 
medication and was concerned about the side effects, which included substantial weight 
gain, reduction in stamina, and loss of motivation."98 E.S., also referred to as Dr. S. 
because she had a medical degree, feared her prescription medication, Zyprexia, would 
cause her death due to a televised report about the drug. Despite her treatment 
compliance and legitimate health concerns, the patient was unable to convince the Board 
of her capacity to consent. 
At another CTO hearing, Ms. L.M.'S psychiatrist insisted that "LM's understanding of 
her illness does not always translate to taking steps in her ongoing daily living. It is more 
an intellectual process that does not translate into reality." 9 The fact that she says she 
takes her medication automatically, the Board argued, suggests a lack of agency on her 
part, and therefore, her status as incapable of consenting was upheld. In this case, even 
E.S., Re, 2004, CanLII 30068 (ON C.C.B.), www.canlii.com. accessed online May 3, 2006 
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where the subject is complying with the health duty by taking her medication, her 
motives for doing so and her capacity for agency are both questioned. 
There are even cases where testimony presented by witnesses for the patients is rejected. 
In Starson v. Swayze (1999), the Board acknowledged that it had "largely discounted" the 
evidence provided by friends and colleagues of Professor Starson. The basis for rejecting 
this evidence was that those individuals did not have access to as much medical 
information as that available to the doctors, that their evidence was inconsistent with the 
other evidence before the Board, and the unlikelihood that any of them understood the 
legal test for capacity under the Act. This is a compelling example of an institution of 
psycho-legal expertise making claims to "truth." 
Furthermore, even where a patient was found capable of consenting, the sincerity of the 
testimony was placed in question, as evidenced in this statement from R.R.: 
We found that RR was clearly a bright person. There was evidence in the various 
clinical records filed that Dr. Doan believed that as well. A concern we had 
centred on whether RR actually believed what he told the panel. We found no 
reason to discount his evidence. In our unanimous opinion Dr. Doan's evidence 
as to RR's incapacity seemed to center more on refusal to weigh consequences 
rather than ability101. 
There is also evidence in the case law that there is a lack of full disclosure of the risks 
and benefits of treatment to patients. In the case of H.R., the Board stated that it was not 
necessary to discuss the risks and benefits of treatment with a patient once the 
psychiatrist was of the opinion that the patient failed one part of the capacity to consent 
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test. Even where the patient is found to have the ability to understand the relevant 
information, the psychiatrist believed it unnecessary to disclose the information, as this 
statement suggests: 
Mr. Mclver [counsel for H.R.] submitted that Dr. Grant's failure to have full 
discussions about the risks and benefits of treatment eroded the value of the 
finding that Mr. H.R. was incapable. We disagree. Capacity requires both the 
ability to understand relevant information and the ability to appreciate the 
reasonable foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision or lack of it. As Mr. 
H.R. did not have the latter ability, Dr. Grant did not have to prove he did not 
have the former.1 2 
In other words, the patient must prove they have the ability to "appreciate the reasonable 
foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision" without having those consequences 
disclosed to them. The Board's decision goes on to state, "Mr. H.R. could discuss the 
risks of treatment with pharmaceuticals but could not see any benefit to them" (my 
emphasis).103 
This lack of disclosure and tendency on the part of the psychiatric community to 
highlight the benefits of treatment to the exclusion of the risks is consistent with the 
universal consent principles set out in the U.N. Principles for the protection of persons 
with mental illness and for the improvement of mental health care adopted in 1991. 
According to Gendreau, the U.N. instrument 
provides the patient who refuses or wants to stop a treatment with a particular 
right to information: 'The consequences of refusing or stopping treatment must be 
explained.' Why is this kind of information only required when a person refuses 
or wants to stop a treatment? On the contrary, it should be part of the right to 
information included in the definition of informed consent. This provision shows 
an obvious tendency to presume that the refusal of treatment always and 
exclusively has negative effects and that the acceptance of treatment always and 
H.R., Re, 2004 CanLII 30069 (ON C.C.B.), wwv.canlii.com, accessed May 3, 2006. 
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exclusively has positive effects. It implies that everything must be done to make 
those who refuse treatment change their minds (Gendreau, 1997, 272). 
Our current understanding of mental capacity emerges from legal and psychiatric texts as 
sites of knowledge production. Out of the psycho-legal discourse emerges our 
knowledge about psychiatric subjects who are incapable of consenting and what that 
incapacity looks like. "Just as discourses exclude or marginalize some other discourses 
while empowering others, so sites of knowledge also subordinate other knowledge" 
(Hunt and Wickham, 1994, 13). What these case studies reveal is that the subjects' 
knowledge and experience of their illness and relationships to medication is subverted as 
yet another symptom of their mental condition. 
The judge in Neto v. Klukach, however, did acknowledge the Court's tendency to dismiss 
patient's evidence and the risk to autonomy posed by equating disorder with incapacity: 
[T]he Board must avoid the error of equating the presence of a mental disorder 
with incapacity. People who have mental disorders are perhaps most at risk of 
having their personal autonomy overridden by the likely unconscious imposition 
of value judgments. It is easy to conclude that if a person chooses a course of 
treatment which appears to be reasonable and wise, then the person is capable; 
whereas, if a person chooses treatment that doctors consider to be contrary to the 
best interests of the patient, or even patently unwise, then the person is incapable. 
Those with mental illness are perhaps most vulnerable to having their experiences 
with reactions to medications and personal views regarding treatment options not 
taken seriously, but instead attributed to the mental illness itself, if contrary to 
what is considered conventional wisdom.104 
In turning to an emphasis on self-discipline in his later work, Foucault identified 
"subjugated knowledges" - "those knowledges that tend to be buried and disguised 
beneath more dominant, often more 'scientific' or 'expert' knowledges" (Lupton, 1997, 
Neto v. Klukach [2004] O.T.C. 138, par. 12. 
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104). The case law presented here suggests that the knowledge these psychiatric patients 
form with respect to treatment is readily subjugated. Their experiences and concerns 
with side effects are regularly dismissed as an effect of their delusional state. 
When consulting a doctor, individuals may, on at least some occasions, 
and if they so choose, attempt to struggle against, challenge or subvert 
those disciplinary techniques they experience as restricting of their 
autonomy. That patients often fail to take 'doctors' orders' is evident in 
the extensive medical literature on the problem of patient compliance with 
medical regimes (Lupton, 1997, 105). 
Lupton argues that the "good patient" seeks freedom from symptoms and disease not as a 
passive, docile patient but as an active health "consumer" (ibid.). By that criteria, the 
non-compliant psychiatric patient resisting their incapable status is by definition a "bad 
patient." That resistance, however, is part of the legal governance of the subject; it is 
never complete but part of the "attempt to control-failure-attempt to control" cycle (Hunt 
andWickham, 1994). 
In conclusion, what emerges from the Ontario's capacity to consent case law is that the 
risk of harm posed by psychopharmaceutical treatments is downplayed and patients' 
experiences of these risks rejected as a mere symptom of their condition. The benefits of 
these chemical treatments and the risks associated with treatment non-compliance are 
upheld as the "truth" - a "truth" the incapable subject is presumably unable to see 
through the lens of their disorder. 
This dominant discourse details the boundaries of what "choices" the psychiatric subject 
is persuaded to make - treatment compliance or forced treatment compliance. Failure on 
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the part of the patient to meet the first obligation of self-knowledge - insight into their 
condition, entails the convergence of legal and psychiatric authority. The legal discourse 
here gives the appearance of arguing against conflating treatment refusal with incapacity, 
but where that refusal is said to be the result of a lack of insight, the end result for the 
patient is the same - a determination of incapacity. 
A limit to the affinity between legal and psychiatric discourses again lies where 
psychiatric authorities rely on arguments of what is in the "best interests" of the patient. 
It is unclear, however, whether mention would be made of the existence of these best 
interest arguments had the patient in question not otherwise obviously met the legal 
criteria for capacity to consent. 
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Chapter Six: 
Duty Of Care, Right To Health And The Duty To Be Well 
[T]he right to treatment predominates with health as a strong symbolic 
underlying value. This health value, I must underline, is exclusively 
reduced to a medical perspective and it implies, for the psychiatric 
patient, the obligation to be treated without due consideration of his or 
her capacity to consent to treatment (Gendreau, 1997, 276). 
Gendreau highlights the value placed on health and how this is aligned with arguments 
for the right to treatment. This understanding of right to health pits the right to refuse 
treatment against the right to treatment. Within this discourse, the patient's refusal itself 
is seen as a "symptom of mental illness" and reason enough to need to treat (1997, 269). 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the tendency to view treatment refusal as a 
symptom of illness is a feature of the psycho-legal discourse. 
The tendency seemingly runs counter to our current neo-liberal form of governance; one 
which champions individual freedom, choice, autonomy and rights against patriarchal 
state intervention (Lupton, 1999). However, as I will argue in this chapter, subjects 
remain "intensely governed" (Rose, 1999a): political, economic, social and cultural forms 
of regulation continue to structure the field of possible actions from which subjects may 
"choose" (Otero, 2003). 
One feature of neo-liberalism is that individuals are increasingly responsible for their 
own health outcomes. I argue that this "duty to be well" (Greco, 1993) extends to those 
diagnosed with psychiatric disorders as evidenced by the implementation of community 
treatment laws. These orders "compel medication compliance in the community under 
pain of involuntary psychiatric admission" (Szigeti, 2001, 25-26). As Brophy and 
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McDermott point out, in the wake of deinstitutionalization there has been an increasing 
concern regarding the apparent risks posed by people with mental health problems living 
in the community (2003). A response to this is to ensure that those individuals remain 
under the effects of psychiatric treatment (i.e., drugs), while living in the community. 
Critics of CTOs, however, argue they are methods of coercion, which erode patients' 
rights and are a way to circumvent the provision of effective public mental health 
services while forcing patients to take psychotropic medications associated with 
numerous side effects (O'Reilly, 2004). Psychiatric survivors have gone so far as to call 
CTOs a form of "chemical incarceration" (Fabris, 2006, 7). 
The third matter considered in capacity to consent decisions, the goals and consequences 
of the proposed treatment, I argue, aligns the normative value of health with the patient's 
duty to be well. Forced treatment compliance, whether within the involuntary committal 
setting or in the community under a community treatment order, compels the patient to 
adhere to the dominant health value. As Greco observes, the notion of "health as a right" 
is replete with notions of "health as a duty of subordination to authority" (Greco, 2004, 
2). The traditional paternalistic psychiatric discourse arguing for a right to treat those in 
need of treatment becomes a duty to be treated under Ontario's capacity to consent laws. 
A contradiction inherent in neo-liberal doctrine becomes evident here. It is a myth that 
reduced state involvement, a key component of neo-liberal ideology, is actually achieved 
through policies that give the outward appearance of divestment. In the "roll-out" phase 
of neo-liberalism, new regulatory institutions are created (Keil, 2002, 581). Harris' 
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Common Sense Revolution, while exalting the virtues of a small, accountable 
government, was actually "highly interventionist." One example of this intervention is 
the creation of community treatment legislation. By broadening the category of persons 
subject to compulsory psychiatric treatment and extending the territory over which legal 
governance of the incapable psychiatric subject could be exercised beyond the borders of 
bricks-and-mortar facilities, government intervention is effectively increased (Fabris, 
2006). Meanwhile, public housing programs were "rolled back," severely limiting the 
"space" for subjects of CTOs in the community while the Safe Streets Act, legislation 
designed to criminalize homelessness and panhandling was "rolled out" (Keil, 2002, 
588). 
What Ontario's consent and capacity law suggests is that there has been a shift from the 
state's duty to care for the patient, based on the concept of Parens Patriae, to the 
patient's "duty to be well." The state's involvement is not reduced however, rather it 
shifts from that of care to that of enforced health. This shift is evident from the changes 
in the expressed goals of forced treatment and community treatment orders, as found in 
these cases. Where previous legislation and psychopharmaceutical limitations meant that 
the goals of treatment were the alleviation of symptoms and control of the patient's 
behaviour within the confines of a psychiatric institution, CTO provisions combined with 
second-generation anti-psychotic medications shift the focus onto individual self-care. 
To be able to reintegrate into the community, and remain in the community rather than be 
institutionalized, the subject of the CTO must show the ability to care for their self by 
adhering to the treatment plan. Since the price to pay for non-compliance with the 
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treatment plan is re-institutionalization, the psychiatric subject does indeed have a duty to 
be well. 
These goals remain in line with the psychiatric "right to treatment" discourse which states 
that, in theory, "the 'serious and persistently mentally ill' should, by chemical 
management of their symptoms, recover their reason and conduct themselves accordingly 
within society; responsibility confers rights" (Fabris, 2006, 46-47). Responsibility here is 
imposed through chemical restraint. While these goals imply that subjects recover their 
capacity for self-determination, the continued legal governance of incapable psychiatric 
subjects severely limits their field of possible choices of conduct. 
The Duty of Care 
Justice Misener, in S. (N.) v. Norris, commented on the dual purpose of the Mental 
Health Act: 
Essentially the Mental Health Act is concerned with two things. It is concerned 
with the rights of persons who, because of mental disorder, find themselves in 
attendance at a psychiatric hospital. It is concerned as well with society's 
obligation to provide treatment to those patients for the mental disorders from 
which they suffer. These two concerns are not always in harmony.' 
The legislation thus seeks to balance individual rights with societal obligations of care. 
That obligation is normally characterized in terms of providing a treatment, and, 
specifically, a chemical psychopharmaceutical treatment. 
As an early example illustrates, the goal of ordering forced treatment for an incapacitated 
involuntary patient was to ameliorate and stabilize the patient's condition. 
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The evidence showed that his condition was incurable. The attending physician 
obtained an order authorizing the administration of neuroleptic drugs and related 
medical treatment. The drugs had been found to have alleviated the symptoms of 
the appellant's condition, reducing the delusions and disturbed state resulting 
therefrom and enabling the appellant to function moderately well in a social 
context within the institution.106 
The goal of treatment is thus both medical and social. Through forced administration of 
neuroleptic medication, it is hoped the patient's condition will improve by alleviating the 
symptoms of disease. In the absence of these symptoms, it is argued, the patient will be 
unable to function in accordance with the norms of the institution. 
Similarly, the stated benefits of treatment in Gallagher's case are described as bringing 
about a state of normalcy and a degree of dignity. The judge stated, 
Kenneth Gallagher, I find, is suffering indescribable agony as an uncontrolled 
psychotic, isolated from the only world he has come to know, I have no hesitation 
in making the order requested to provide to him as much normalcy and dignity as 
possible, pending the outcome of the appeal, in the knowledge that the 
countervailing risks in his particular case, appear to be minimal.107 
The court ordered treatment pending appeal since the benefits of immediate treatment 
were found to outweigh the risk of harm to the patient. There was evidence that the 
medications had worked in the past by alleviating symptoms, allowing the patient to 
regain a level of autonomy by reducing the risks of harm to himself and to other patients 
and staff. 
Fleming v. Reid (1990) (head note) 
Fleming v. Gallagher (No. 1) (1990) 74 O.R. (2d) 317 (322 b) 
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Induced Capacity to Consent 
With the Starson case, we see evidence of incapacity to consent determinations being 
used as a catalyst for future treatment compliance through the use of forced medication. 
The idea is that, under the effects of medication, the patient's mental condition will 
improve to the extent that they are indeed capable of forming valid consent and, at such 
time, will choose to consent to, and comply with, their treatment plan. In Starson's initial 
appeal from the Consent and Capacity's Board's finding of incapacity (1999), one 
treatment goal stated by Starson's psychiatrist was to induce treatment compliance. The 
strategy employed is one of getting Starson's brain activity to "normal" levels (through 
forced medication) so that he will be capable of treatment compliance. His psychiatrist 
also used the possibility of future release as a motivator for complying with treatment. 
Dr. Swayze hoped Professor Starson might agree to take the other drugs "if his psychosis 
would remit sufficiently" as a result of the injections, although this had never occurred 
before. Alternatively, he thought that Professor Starson might see the Ontario Review 
Board as a "serious motivator" and take the oral drugs as the intelligent option after a risk 
benefit analysis, even without insight into his illness.108 
The Superior Court Judge replied, "The Board was apparently of the view that unless 
Professor Starson receives the proposed medication, his likelihood of release by the 
Review Board would be diminished" (par. 24). Release is therefore used as a bargaining 
chip by the Board to secure treatment compliance. The question is, had Starson initially 
showed agreement to treatment, would his capacity to consent ever have come into 
question? 
108
 Starson v. Swayze (1999) 22 Admin L.R. (3d) 211, par. 49. 
125 
The "Normalizing" Process 
Starson's psychiatrists also stated that the purpose of the proposed treatment was 
"normalization:" To "slow down" his thought processes to a "normal level range of 
mood and thought process without psychosis." Although similar treatment had not 
worked in the past, they argued that this was because there had not been a long enough 
treatment period (par. 51).10 
Before the Court of Appeal, Starson stated: 
Well, like all psychiatrists that I've met before them, they all think the same way, 
that the only thing they can do is to give you these chemicals - and I've been 
through these chemicals that they propose before - and I know the effects and 
what they want to achieve is to slow down my brain, basically, and to slow down 
my brain which means I can't do what I've been trying to do - or what I have been 
doing for 30 years and will be successful at doing. And that would just be like 
worse than death.'' 
The normalizing process is precisely what Starson rejects and resists, and, based on 
Starson's ability to perceive the reasonable foreseeable consequences of the 
"normalizing" effects of the medication on his ability to perform his work as a physicist, 
the Supreme Court deemed 
Professor Starson is entitled to make his own treatment decisions. He is not 
required to make his decision on a basis that the Board finds reasonable or wise. 
Nor is he required to adopt a lifestyle or way of thinking which accords with the 
Board's or the respondents' views of what is 'normal.'111 
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When referring to bringing about a state of "normality" through medication, it is 
important to consider that norms of health are socially defined. These social norms result 
from heterogeneous practices of dominant knowledge, such as that of biomedical experts 
(Greco, 2004, 4). Starson actively resists these practices of dominance, yet his 
psychiatrists responded with several attempts of control, having challenged Starson's 
capacity to consent through four levels of court. 
Reducing the "Risk of Dangerousness" 
In addition to its normalizing effects, forced treatment of incapable patients is associated 
with reducing risks, most notably, the risk of dangerousness. This treatment goal was 
stated in Khan v. Thompson (1992): 
The availability of treatment which may reduce her dangerousness favours that 
custodial setting over the penitentiary system which lacks such measures and 
which can only respond to manifested or apprehended dangerousness by non-
therapeutic corrective measures (31 Id). 
In later cases, the reduction of risk is also a condition of returning to the community. 
In Kirpiev v. Peat, we find the goal of reducing dangerousness, specifically reducing the 
risk that Kirpiev would become involved in criminal activity once released into the 
community: 
The proposed treatment would decrease the paranoia and permit him to be more 
cooperative in his discharge planning as well as decreasing the risk that his 
aggressive state would lead to a criminal offence (par. 36). 
In other cases, the "risk" associated with non-treatment is not clearly stated, although the 
goal of discharge in the community remains: 
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The goal of discharge held by the physician was in keeping with R.F's prior wish 
that he "be treated with the lowest practical dose that would get him well enough 
to be discharged from hospital..." (Par. 10). On the evidence that was before the 
Board, it was clear that R.F.'s current treatment was not working, and without 
some other treatment, his core delusions would remain and he would continue to 
be at risk if discharged from hospital (Par. 11). 
R.F.'s prior capable wish was thus ignored in favour of a more progressive course of 
treatment towards achieving improved mental health and risk reduction. 
Repeated references are made to patients being "at risk." The nature of that risk is often 
vague and unspecified. Being deemed "at risk" has become a means of social 
identification, and one need not be ill (yet) to be so labelled (Davidson et al. 1994, 355 
cited in Nettleton 1997, 215). As Petersen points out, "the distinction between healthy 
and unhealthy populations totally dissolves since everything potentially is a source of 
'risk' and everyone can be seen to be 'at risk'" (1997, 195). Additionally, failure to 
conduct oneself in a risk-free manner is seen as a failure of self-control and a failure to 
comply with citizenship obligations (Petersen 1997, 198). These obligations extend to all 
contemporary subjects within the realm of neo-liberal governance, not merely psychiatric 
subjects. 
While "risk" is frequently referred to using the general term of being "at risk," in Conway 
v. Jacques (2005), we find a rare disclosure of the specific risk of suicide: "Dr. Jacques 
believes that if Mr. Conway is not treated, he will remain at Oak Ridge for the rest of his 
life, and will be at risk of suicide" (par. 28). 
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In his case, self-regulation is the treatment goal, but we also find the rarely cited goal of 
enabling the patient to take part in psychotherapy: 
Dr. Jacques expects that psychotropic medications would substantially alleviate 
Mr. Conway's feelings of vulnerability and persecution, improve his capacity to 
regulate his affect and his ability to focus on constructive activities, and enable 
him to engage in long-term psychotherapies that might resolve his underlying 
issues (Par. 24). 
Posing a risk to others is often "added on" to posing a risk to self such that the phrase 
"posing a risk of harm to self or others" becomes a blanket statement. In Allihebi (2001) 
for example, the judge agreed that the evidence presented suggested "he would pose a 
risk of harm to himself and others" (par. 12). Mr. Allihebi was described as having 
paranoid-type schizophrenia. He had been fasting because he heard voices from God 
telling him to do so. Consequently, he was near-death as a result of his refusal to eat or 
drink (par. 7-8). Although the risk of non-treatment was described as becoming a danger 
to self and others, no indications were given as to how he posed a risk to anyone but 
himself. 
The case of H.L. is important for highlighting that findings of incapacity to consent to 
community treatment orders are not necessarily tied to a concern for public security. As 
this case suggests, actual evidence of past aggression and danger to others are not 
necessarily factors in the determination of capacity to consent. Mr. L had been diagnosed 
with treatment-resistant schizophrenia. He was described as abusing alcohol, cocaine and 
marijuana and is HIV and hepatitis A, B, and C positive, none of which is treated. He 
had been found not criminally responsible on an assault charge. On another occasion, he 
forcibly removed a child from its parents' arms, for which he was not charged. He has 
129 
been barred from boarding homes, the Mission Shelter and the Shepherds for Good Hope 
due to threatening and aggressive behaviour and, in the last case, for throwing a rock 
through a window.U2 
He was admitted to hospital after presenting himself to an emergency ward where "it was 
obvious to those who saw him there that he was not coping very well and was unable to 
comply with the CTO." He was detained for a psychiatric evaluation and, in Dr. 
Spindler's opinion, Mr. L was incapable of consenting to a CTO and, due to his non-
compliance with treatment, he remains a danger to others if left in the community. 
Furthermore, he was unable to find a medical supervisor willing to be assigned to his 
1 1"} 
treatment in the community. 
The case before the Board involves Mr. L's challenge to Dr. Spindler's finding that he 
was incapable of consenting to a community treatment order. Mr. L's testimony before 
the Board made it clear that he was aware of his diagnosis and acknowledged that he 
suffers from a mental illness. He was also able to articulate the benefits of treatment and 
how his condition deteriorated without the treatment. He was therefore declared capable 
of consenting to a treatment plan. Therefore, no CTO was ordered and he remained a 
patient on a voluntary basis, free to go as he pleases.'14 
1,2
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A link has traditionally been made between criminality/dangerousness and mental illness. 
Individuals with psychiatric disorders are thought to be more "dangerous" than the 
"average" citizen. However, as Anita Szigeti points out, 
The myth of the dangerous mentally ill patient no longer requires serious debate 
within the professional community of our mental health system. It is clear that 
alcohol and substance abuse and many other factors, such as a prior history of 
criminal behaviour, or even age and gender, are more solid predictors of violence 
than a diagnosis of mental illness (Szigeti, 2001, LEXIS online publication). 
Despite evidence to the contrary, the media portrayal of the dangerous psychiatric patient 
continues to fuel public fears. The naming of mental health legislation after the victims 
of crimes at the hands of the mentally ill serves to legitimize this belief. The law on 
community treatment orders was introduced, in part, as a means of reducing the risks 
posed by the mentally ill in the community; by creating a means by which the mentally ill 
would remain in the community only under the effects of medication. Although named 
after Ottawa sportscaster Brian Smith, killed by Jeffery Arenberg in 1997, two other 
incidents of that year are cited as the impetus behind community treatment order 
provisions being added to the Mental Health Act. Szigeti notes the media coverage of 
these events strongly suggested that these deaths would have been avoided had the 
patients been medicated (2001). Naming legislation aimed at ensuring the chemical 
control of patients with serious mental illness after rare incidents of violence perpetuates 
the public fear of the mentally ill as dangerous (O'Reilly, 2004, 583). Events such as 
these have lead Bassman to conclude that "emotionally charged rhetoric designed to 
incite and frighten the public is positioned through well-funded campaign strategies to 
make forced treatment the dominant answer to the mental illness problem" (2005, 489). 
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Goals and Benefits of CTOs 
Not all of the decisions analyzed contained full details of the treatment plans. Based on 
the details provided, the treatment plans contained in community treatment orders vary in 
their degree of surveillance and control over the psychiatric subject. J.F.'s plan was not 
uncommon: 
That Plan included provisions that JF continue taking anti-psychotic medications 
as prescribed and that she be monitored. JF was also to attend appointments with 
her psychiatrist and other follow up and support.115 
No matter how comprehensive the plan, the message remains that they are "less 
restrictive than being detained in a psychiatric facility." In commenting on Mr. E.S.'s 
plan, the Board notes, 
[I]t allows Mr. E.S. to within reason live where he wants such as in his trailer in 
the summer and obtaining employment as he has with the Town of 
Penetanguishene. He has freedom to do what he wishes with his day provided he 
is taking his medication and symptoms of his illness are not exacerbating.'16 
Freedom is thus contingent upon psychiatric wellness through medication, improved self-
care, social relations and increased civic involvement. "All active citizens have a right 
and a duty to maintain, contribute to and ensure [...] their health status" (Nettleton, 1997, 
208). Incapable psychiatric subjects are no exception. 
Improved self-care is key in the pronounced treatment benefits. However, as Petersen 
suggests, "[disagreement among experts means that there are rarely coherent sets of 
norms to which one may defer in caring for oneself (Petersen, 1997, 201). For example, 
while the subject of a CTO, C.I. was described as "more aware of the need to care for 
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herself and lose excess weight. She was able to listen to the news and to be in touch with 
world events. She talked to her daughters at least daily." However, she is also described 
as only going for groceries, not having contact with others, not having any friends, and, it 
is noted that she "talked about the side effects of medication, fatigue and lethargy in 
particular," a behaviour which is problematized. These statements are contradictory and 
suggest that the psycho-legal authority of the Consent and Capacity Board has a 
particular ideal of behaviour the patient ought to comply with, but, disagreeing as they do 
amongst themselves makes this "ideal" particularly elusive for the subject compelled to 
negotiate this incoherent set of "norms." 
E.S. showed improved self-care and was able to secure supportive housing and a 
disability pension. She did some volunteer work for the elections. Ms. B.C. is described 
as requiring continuing treatment, care and supervision in the community. She was also 
taking part in community programmes and "exhibited better judgment" as a result of the 
CTO. The evidence in K.T.'s case "revealed Ms. T made wonderful progress with the 
support of the care team in her housing [...]. She demonstrated 'organized and 
appropriate thought content generally without hallucinations or delusions' and appeared 
happy, cooperative and willing to engage her roommates, the CTO staff and the staff at 
the housing unit where she resided."117 These examples all point to the psycho-legal 
discourse on the benefits of CTO-enforced treatment compliance - improved self-care 
through treatment and supervision, secured housing, and civic involvement. Through this 
discourse an entrepreneurial psychiatric subject emerges - the subject remains 
117
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categorized as "incapable of consenting to treatment" yet is made to meet her 
entrepreneurial obligations through chemical regulation. 
The duty to be well is linked to the duty to be free of risk; of risk of harm; risk of 
dangefousness. Security in these cases is a function of risk reduction. Regardless of a 
lack of evidence supporting the view that psychiatric patients are more dangerous than 
other members of the public, that risk of danger to others remains an argument for the 
forced treatment of incapable subjects. However, a patient's insight into their condition, 
as evidenced by their ability to articulate the benefits of treatment and the risks of non-
treatment, trumps the concern about future risk of harm, dangerousness and security 
breaches. 
In the case of patients found to be lacking in capacity and thus the freedom of self-
formation, coercive practices are still relied upon. This goes counter to the shift Foucault 
discusses in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. He states, "these games of truth no longer 
involve a coercive practice, but a practice of self-formation of the patient" (1997, 282). 
While the goal of forced treatment may be to bring about a state of self-awareness in 
terms of insight into illness, self-care in terms of wilful treatment compliance and self-
formation in terms of bringing the patient to a level of freedom and civility through 
psychopharmaceuticals, the practice of coercion in the form of community treatment 
orders and forced medication of incapacitated patients remains. 
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The goals of treatment expressed in the case law vary over time. Normalizing the patient 
through alleviation of symptoms within an institutional setting was the goal in the early 
days of capacity to consent legislation. With the advent of second-generation 
psychopharmaceuticals, deinstitutionalization, social rehabilitation and drug-induced 
treatment compliance became the goals. Since CTOs have been introduced, improved 
self-care in a supervised community setting has become the enunciated goal of treatment. 
Alongside this goal is that of reduced risk of deterioration of the patient's condition and 
the reduced risk of harm to self and others. This reduction of risk is frequently presented 
in terms of a reduced "risk of dangerousness" perpetuating the myth of the dangerous 
psychiatric subject. Problematizing the condition of the subject further legitimates the 
need to impose compulsory treatment, thereby overriding the subjects' right to self-
determination. The therapeutic psycho-legal discourse calls for the forced chemical 
treatment of incapable subjects, whether those drugs themselves impose a danger or not 
(Bay, 2003). An intriguing contradiction arises where the danger of chemicals is 
downplayed while the idea of the dangerousness of the untreated psychiatric subject is 
perpetuated. The forced chemical treatment of the subject, as Fabris observes, suggests 
that the subject has a problem of the self which must be worked upon and that chemical 
treatment is the only responsible "choice" to make in this situation (2006, 147). 
The "myth of dangerousness" associated with the mentally ill continues to be perpetuated 
by these judgments and the legislation behind them. Rather than being rejected, this 
argument is used to expand the scope of psycho-legal governance of the incapable 
psychiatric subject. Not only is the role of the "psy sciences" extended through risk 
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discourses by including the task of making future predictions of pathology, but the legal 
instruments for dealing with that role are also extended. The addition of community 
treatment order legislation gives legal authority, and further legitimates, the predictive 
role of the psychiatric expert. 
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Chapter Seven: Concluding Remarks 
I began this thesis by introducing the significance of a psychiatric patient being found 
incapable of consenting to treatment. Patients such as these lose their legal right to self-
determination and hence freedom to choose to accept or reject a proposed treatment. In 
this age of "freedom of choice," it is important to challenge our commonly conceived 
notions of what that "freedom" entails. One way of investigating this dominant discourse 
on freedom is to examine examples of constraints imposed on freedom. I noted that 
strategies taken to determine and regulate incapacity claim to seek a balance between 
individual rights and public safety. However, I have also argued that recent legislative 
changes in the province of Ontario have expanded the scope of legal governance of 
incapable psychiatric subjects. Concerns over risks posed by community-based treatment 
have led to the "implementation of measures to increase the surveillance, supervision and 
support of discharged patient." Among these were legal measures implemented to ensure 
treatment compliance (Goodwin, 1997, 262), namely, community treatment orders. 
I could have explored other scenarios - being found incapable of consenting to medical 
treatment or procedures (a rising problem as our population ages), or incapacity to 
consent to admission to a care facility or to manage property. I chose the topic of 
capacity to consent specifically as it pertains to psychiatric subjects because mental 
illness itself remains problematized and highly discursive. The language governing our 
understanding of mental illness continues to be that of "risk and danger" (Blackman, 
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2000, 58-59). Furthermore, as Jeremy Laurance observed, in the aftermath of relatively 
rare occurrences of acts of violence perpetrated by discharged mental health patients, the 
"focus shifted from the care of the patients to the protection of the public. The 
psychopathic murderer - the mad axeman of popular myth - became the new monster in 
our midst. Risk avoidance and public safety became the new watchwords" (2003, xiii). 
The means by which a psychiatric patient comes to be declared capable or incapable of 
consenting to treatment designed to reduce their risk and danger is therefore an important 
area to research. This change in focus in mental health policy led me to put forward that 
the guiding principle behind capacity to consent law changed from that of the state's 
"duty to care" to the patient's "duty to be well." By being found incapable of consenting 
to treatment, the patient becomes subject to enforced treatment compliance, whether 
within the involuntary committal setting or in the community under a community 
treatment order. The patient is therefore compelled to adhere to the dominant health 
value, but, furthermore, since treatment is argued to be a means of reducing 
"dangerousness," enforcing treatment compliance is legitimated as a means of ensuring 
public security. 
In the first chapter I mapped out significant changes in the legislative history of Ontario's 
capacity consent laws. I argued that the contemporary legal history of mental incapacity 
emerged alongside our current neo-liberal form of governance. The contemporary 
notions of capacity to consent and the right to refuse psychiatric treatment show affinities 
to the production of the neo-liberal subject: one called upon to be a responsible, 
autonomous, entrepreneurial citizen. I also showed how the history of Ontario's capacity 
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to consent to treatment laws highlights conflicting principles of neo-liberalism: The 
principles of autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and the duty to be well 
on the other. Where autonomy rights have been extended to psychiatric subjects in the 
name of expanding freedom of choice, restrictions have also been placed on that freedom 
such that freedoms may only be exercised in line with the duties of a responsible, healthy 
citizen. Where neo-liberal doctrine calls for reduced state intervention, governance of the 
incapable psychiatric subject has actually multiplied. One strategy employed for 
expanding the control and surveillance of the psychiatric subject was the expansion of 
commitment criteria based on a series of potential "risks of harm." Another was to 
include treatment incapacity as an additional commitment criterion. These changes, I 
argued, are a response to public fears over security risks posed by the psychiatric subject. 
I have also shown that the history of capacity to consent law in Ontario is one of 
competing claims to authority between law and psychiatry. Throughout the history of 
capacity to consent law, legal restrictions on psychiatric practice have been resisted by 
psychiatric professionals eager to legitimize their authority and expertise over the realm 
of the psychiatric subject. In the end, law adopts the discourse of psychiatry as a means 
of placating public fears through the adoption of CTO legislation. 
In chapter two, I briefly discussed the weakness of traditional theoretical approaches to 
capacity to consent and how I would attempt to go beyond their dichotomous assertion of 
power as either legitimate or illegitimate by adopting a genealogical approach. A 
genealogical approach to a topic, in this case, capacity to consent, considers the 
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"conditions of possibility" which give rise to a particular phenomenon, or, as Hunt and 
Wickham define it, "what combination of circumstances in dispersed and seemingly 
unconnected fields of social activity combines in such a way to give rise to some 
outcome" (1994, 6). Adopting this approach to the present study allows us to view 
capacity to consent law as a form of legal governance of psychiatric subjects. In doing 
so, I aimed to explore how mental capacity, as a legal and psychiatric concept, has 
developed alongside a particular route of social economy: the emergence of neo-
liberalism. 
I also discussed the "conditions of possibility" aligned with the emergence of neo-liberal 
doctrine according to governmentality theorists: political divestment, 
deinstitutionalization, assumptions of self-regulating entrepreneurial subjects based on 
theories of the "psy sciences," and the proliferation of "risk" discourses. These strategies 
of governance have all produced regulatory effects and those effects are felt throughout 
society - this thesis examines one microcosm of those effects - the governance of 
psychiatric subjects. 
In chapter three I discussed the importance of analyzing the discourse of capacity to 
consent as contained in capacity to consent case law: these legal decisions, I argued, 
contain textual evidence for how knowledge about incapable psychiatric subjects is 
produced. Since these texts result from an adversarial process, both dominant and 
counter discourses surrounding capacity to consent are presented. I argued that the 
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dominant discourse on incapacity to consent to psychiatric treatment would be aligned 
with the dominant form of political rationality, neo-liberalism. 
I also explained how this study would follow from Hunt and Wickham's principles for 
analyzing law as a form of governance. This analysis of governance was particularly 
concerned with how knowledge (informed as it is by the "psy sciences") was used in 
legal deliberations and, ultimately, to reform the conduct of psychiatric subjects. 
Chapters four, five, and six presented an analysis of the discourse contained in the legal 
judgments. I observed that the decision to overturn a psychiatrist's determination of 
incapacity essentially involved three questions: 1) the patient's insight into their 
condition, 2) the evidence of treatment effectiveness, and 3) the goals and consequences 
of treatment or lack of treatment. I approached each of these considerations in these three 
chapters. 
The subject's ability to demonstrate insight into their condition was a key concern for 
court justices and Board members alike. I argued that this obligation was in line with the 
dominant psychiatric discourse on mental illness and that this discourse was adopted by 
legal authorities to the extent that inability to articulate insight on the part of the patient 
eroded any legal right to self-determination. I therefore observed that freedom was 
contingent upon insight. Showing insight resulted in the freedom to take risks by 
refusing treatment; treatment refusal is couched in terms of "risk" even where a subject is 
found capable of forming consent. Failure by the psychiatric subject to meet this 
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condition of freedom resulted in the imposition of the obligation to be healthy in line 
with the "duty to be well." Insight, in these texts, was equated with capacities for self-
knowledge and self-care, in other words, capacities of the entrepreneurial subject. 
Legal and psychiatric discourses have historically been interconnected (Slovenko, 2004). 
That interconnection is apparent in the cases analyzed. The mere fact that the subject's 
incapacity status was overturned in only eight of the forty-six cases points to the tendency 
of legal authorities to adopt the dominant psychiatric discourse. This finding goes 
counter to the tendency of psychiatric professionals to resist legal restraints on their 
practice. While legal authority is exercised over psychiatry in cases where psychiatric 
practitioners have clearly overstepped their boundaries, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases legal and psychiatric discourses converge in the legal governance of the psychiatric 
subject. I also noted that the emergence of new regulatory institutions in line with the 
exercise of governance by expertise is a feature of neo-liberalism (Smith, 1989). 
Ontario's Consent and Capacity Board, an institution of psycho-legal expertise, is, I 
argued, an example of a new regulatory body. Comprised of both legal and psychiatric 
experts, the Board exercises authority over all manner of questions of capacity to consent, 
yet, the infrequency with which the tribunal diverts from the original psychiatric findings 
points to the extent to which this combined regulatory institution aligns itself with the 
"psy" sciences. Since these "psy" sciences have been crucial in constructing both the 
ideal neo-liberal subject and the current form of governing, judgments rendered by the 
Board are hence aligned with neo-liberal rationalities. 
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In chapter five I analyzed how the second consideration, the efficacy of the proposed 
treatment, was examined. I observed that this involved weighing the risk of harm to self 
from side effects against the risk of harm to self, and, as a consequence, harm to others, 
from non-treatment. In keeping with Fabris's findings, the benefits of these chemical 
treatments are upheld in keeping with the brain-disease model and described in such a 
manner as to deny any challenge from patients (Fabris, 2006). Subjects' experiences 
with and concerns about these medications were routinely discounted. While legal 
challenges to the safety of these medications was evident in earlier judgments, justices 
ultimately sided in the psychiatrists' favour as long as the patient failed the insight test. 
Benefits of newer, second-generation medications were used as a proverbial "carrot on a 
stick" to patients. Claims were made that if the patient complied with these treatments, 
they could eventually be considered for release. Refusal of treatment, given the claims 
made, was equated with incapacity - the patient must not have the ability to understand 
the consequences of their decision. This also points to one of the goals of treatment: 
release from a psychiatric institution (under the confines of a community treatment order) 
so that the subject may become self-governable. 
Rose argued that the "at risk" discourse expands the role of the "psy" expert: predicting 
future pathology (1998). This expanded role was clearly evident in the judgments, since 
capacity to consent legislation began including "risk of harm" criteria. The Board went 
so far as to argue that the criteria for a CTO need not be met at the time of a CTO 
hearing; it was sufficient that the patient be "at risk" for meeting the criteria, in absence 
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of treatment, at a later date. While the Superior Court did object to this argument and 
overturn the decision, it is, never the less, an indication of the psycho-legal practice of 
predicting future pathology. Furthermore, while the Superior Court placed limitations on 
the use of the "at risk" discourse in the above case, that does not necessarily extend to the 
multitude of future Board decisions.1' The statement concerning CTOs as a response to 
the "revolving door syndrome" inQ.S.120is evidence of that: 
Clearly, it is a purpose of a community treatment order to prevent the pattern in 
question from occurring in the future, if there is evidence that such might become 
the case. Assuming that to be a constant requirement, one must ask whether a 
finding of such a future risk can be made only on the basis of the number of 
admissions that have already occurred and the interval between them. If so, what 
is a sufficient number? What is an acceptable interval? However, in our opinion, 
the confirmation of a CTO does not depend on the existence of such a past 
pattern, nor is it necessary that one is likely to emerge in the future.121 
What these cases ultimately revealed was that the psychiatric subjects' experience of their 
illness and relationships to medication was subverted as yet another symptom of their 
mental condition. Because of this condition, it is argued, the patient is unable to see the 
"truth" about the benefits of these treatments and the risks associated with not complying 
with their treatment programs. 
The goals of treatment, as found in these cases, have changed over time. Normalizing the 
patient through alleviation of symptoms within an institutional setting was the goal in the 
early days of capacity to consent legislation. These goals were, I argue, in line with a 
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state's "duty to care." With the advent of second-generation psychopharmaceuticals, 
deinstitutionalization, social rehabilitation and drug-induced treatment compliance 
became the goals. It is hoped that, through medications, patients will achieve a level of 
functioning where they can govern themselves. Under the constraint of CTOs, reduction 
of "risk" is key: reduced risk of harm to self and others. This reduction of risk is 
frequently presented in terms of a reduced "risk of dangerousness," thus perpetuating the 
myth of the dangerous psychiatric subject. 
Two important points need to be made concerning contradictions inherent to neo-liberal 
doctrine which are made more apparent through this analysis of the legal governance of 
the psychiatric subject. First, the introduction of community treatment orders has 
extended the possibility of forced treatment outside the traditional boundaries of 
involuntary institutions. Rather than reducing the role of the state in mental health 
affairs, this move has actually increased government intervention (Fabris, 2006; Keil, 
2002). Secondly, while the legislation states that this is a means of providing treatment 
in the least restrictive environment, it is also clearly aligned with broader neo-liberal 
strategies by placing the onus on the individual and by having the individual be 
responsible for their own psychiatric health and risk reduction through enforced treatment 
compliance. Where the psychiatric subject has gained "freedom" in the sense of living in 
the community, that subject still remains "intensely governed." Furthermore, they must 
align their freedom within the purview of very constrained "choices" lest they find 
themselves locked behind institutional walls once again. 
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While this study has laid the groundwork for an analytics of capacity to consent law as a 
form of legal governance of psychiatric subjects there are areas of research that could 
expand upon this knowledge. First and foremost would be a gender analysis of capacity 
to consent decisions. It has been argued that women are over-represented and over-
medicated as psychiatric patients (Busfield, 1996). There exists an entire history of 
discourse surrounding women's "irrationality" and madness (ibid). Furthermore, in only 
one of the forty-six cases analysed was a woman's designation of incapacity overturned. 
This suggests a gender bias exists in findings of capacity to consent. The language used 
in the legal decisions to describe the risks associated with treatment non-compliance also 
seems to suggest different decision criteria were at work for men and women. For 
example, alienation and homelessness associated with treatment non-compliance under a 
CTO were problematized more so for women than for men. A wider sample of CTO 
decisions and a corresponding theoretical discussion would be required to fully 
investigate capacity to consent law as a site of production of gendered subjectivity. 
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